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COMPARATIVE PRAGMATISM 
RACHEL REBOUCHÉ* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, Mary Ann Glendon framed Western European and 
North American abortion laws as a choice between the approach of 
the United States, symbolizing the protection of women’s constitu-
tional rights, and the approach of Germany, symbolizing the protec-
tion of fetal constitutional rights.1  For twenty-five years, this dichoto-
my has remained a principal comparison in national court decisions 
from a group of diverse countries and in the curricula of U.S. law 
schools.2  Although several commentators have previously suggested 
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 1.  MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 22–25, 33–38 
(1987).   
 2.  See infra Part II.  The leading comparative constitutional law casebook, for exam-
ple, begins with abortion in the first chapter to provide an illustration of constitutional 
comparativism.  VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1–140 (2d ed. 2006).  The casebook excerpts the U.S. and German cases described in Part 
I, as well as the Canadian case, R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.R. 30 (Can.).  JACKSON & 
TUSHNET, supra.  The casebook contrasts Mary Ann Glendon’s view that U.S. law, like its 
Western European counterparts, should accord greater respect to life with Lawrence 
Tribe’s argument that the U.S. attachment to individual rights and court-enforced norms 
makes a European model untenable.  Id. at 137–39; see also D. MARIANNE BLAIR & MERLE 
H. WEINER, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN 
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that the United States and Germany now share more commonalities 
than differences,3 this Article challenges the conventional wisdom by 
suggesting that the United States and Germany have moved in the 
opposite direction on a spectrum of available abortion services.  In 
the United States, the constitutional right to an abortion is unrealiza-
ble for many women due to restrictive state and federal laws and the 
absence of providers in many areas.4  In Germany, by contrast, despite 
the country’s formal recognition of fetal rights, early abortion is wide-
ly available and often funded by the government.5  In short, the di-
chotomy Professor Glendon described in 1987 may be unrecognizable 
today. 
Yet the comparison between Germany and the United States per-
sists.  Over the last decade, major court decisions in countries such as 
Colombia, South Africa, Portugal, and Mexico have referred to the 
sweeping, global influence of Roe v. Wade.6  At the same time, these 
courts cite a case decided in 1975 by the Federal Constitutional Court 
                                                          
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW 1082–88 (2003) (juxtaposing U.S. and 
German case law in explaining the comparative judicial approach to abortion). 
 3.  Scholars cited by Jackson and Tushnet argue that U.S. and German abortion case 
law share a middle ground that Professors Tribe and Glendon do not sufficiently 
acknowledge.  See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 139 (citing Udo Werner, The Con-
vergence of Abortion Regulation in Germany and the United States: A Critique of Glendon’s Rights 
Talk Thesis, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 571, 601 (1996), for Werner’s argument that “a 
demand for abortion services existed in German society despite the pronouncements of 
the Constitutional Court[, which] proved to be relatively independent from the legal pro-
hibition of abortion”); see also Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in 
German and American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 1045 (“In assessing mod-
ern abortion law in [the United States and Germany], what seems most remarkable is the 
growing convergence of the two laws . . . .”); Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abor-
tion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273, 
273 (1995) (“In practical terms, the situation in Germany now resembles the post-Casey 
situation in Pennsylvania.”); John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology in Germany and the 
United States: An Essay in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 189, 
200 (2004) (arguing that lawyers in the United States will recognize that, in regards to 
abortion, “the balance struck in Germany was similar in many respects to that drawn in the 
United States”).  
 4.  See infra Part III.A. 
 5.  See infra Part III.B. 
 6.  410 U.S. 113 (1973); see infra Part II. 
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of Germany (“FCC”)7 to acknowledge that some countries protect 
“unborn life” under their constitutions.8  With less frequency and for 
similar purposes, contemporary courts also cite to Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey9 and to a 1993 decision of the post-
unification FCC.10  Although national courts mention cases of other 
countries, they consistently focus on the comparison between U.S. 
and German law as evidence of an emerging consensus on the need 
for legal abortion, at least on limited grounds.11 
For example, in 2006, the Constitutional Court of Colombia used 
a legal comparison between U.S. and German law when it struck 
down the country’s criminal ban on abortion and permitted abortion 
in cases of risk to maternal life or health, a criminal act against the 
woman, unwanted artificial reproductive technology, or serious mal-
formation of the fetus.12  The Constitutional Court cited the Roe tri-
                                                          
 7.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 
39 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, translated in Robert 
E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, Transla-
tion of the German Federal Constitutional Court Decision, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 605, 
605–84 (1976). 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 10.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 
88 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203 (translation pro-
vided by author). 
 11.  See infra Part II.  I have chosen decisions of national courts from the last ten years 
that are commonly cited when recent, comparative abortion jurisprudence is discussed.  
See, e.g., Martha Davis, Abortion Access in the Global Marketplace, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1657, 1678–
80 (2010) (discussing decisions from Mexico and Colombia).  I also chose the examples 
presented in this Article based on the length and detail of the comparative analysis in each 
case.   
For a comprehensive, but somewhat dated review of national abortion laws, see Reed 
Boland & Laura Katzive, Developments in Laws on Induced Abortion: 1998–2007, 34 INT’L FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 110 (2008) (discussing the state of abortion laws in 196 countries).  For revi-
sions to national abortion laws updated on a consistent basis, see GUTTMACHER INST., 
INT’L DATA CENTER, http://www.guttmacher.org/idc/countrysummary.jsp (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2012).  Cases decided at the international or regional level are interesting but not 
relevant to the national decisions that are the focus of this article.   
 12.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Plena mayo 10, 2006, 
Sentencia C-355/2006 (p. 356–65) (Colom.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional. 
gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-355-06.htm, excerpts translated in WOMEN’S LINK WORLDWIDE, C-
355/2006: EXCERPTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S RULING THAT LIBERALIZED 
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mester framework as an example of how to balance the rights of 
pregnant women against those of fetuses in the second and third tri-
mesters.  By contrast, the court described the 1975 German decision 
as supporting the countervailing protection for “unborn life.”  The 
limited common ground that U.S. and German case law share, the 
court reasoned, demonstrates a consensus on the basic rights of wom-
en and potential life.13 
Courts contemplating deeper reform also refer to U.S. and Ger-
man jurisprudence.  In 2004, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South 
Africa upheld provisions of a post-apartheid law, the Choice on Ter-
mination of Pregnancy Act of 1996, which grants women of any age 
access to abortion on any ground during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy.14  Similar to the Colombian court, the South African court 
quoted from Roe in support of women’s rights to autonomy and equal-
ity in deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy.  The court de-
scribed the German cases as exceptions to an international consensus 
that fetuses do not enjoy constitutional rights to life.15 
In examining the comparative approach of these and other deci-
sions, it becomes clear that the U.S. and German cases take on mean-
ings that were likely not intended by the courts that issued the origi-
nal decisions.16  Most notably, these contemporary decisions 
misconstrue or misinterpret U.S. and German abortion law.17  The 
South African Supreme Court of Appeal, for example, cited Casey as 
supportive of minors’ independent access to abortion, despite the fact 
                                                          
ABORTION IN COLOMBIA (2007) [hereinafter C-355/2006 EXCERPTS], available at 
http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/pdf_pubs/pub_c3552006 
.pdf. 
 13.  See infra Part II.A. 
 14.  Christian Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Minister of Health 2004 (4) All SA 31 (SCA) at 33, 
35–36, 47–48 (S. Afr.); see also Christian Lawyers Ass’n v. Minister of Health 1998 (4) SA 1113 
(T) at 1117–18 (S. Afr.) (upholding the constitutionality of the 1996 law in a challenge 
based on a right to life from conception).   
 15.  See infra Part II.B.  
 16.  See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 
1225, 1273 (1999) (“A nation that did not have the experience of having to live with the 
knowledge that its people put Hitler in place might not be in a position to learn much 
from the German abortion decisions.”); see also Karen Knop, State Law Without Its State, in 
LAW WITHOUT NATIONS 66, 67–68 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011) (noting how other na-
tions have “disembedded” the original meaning of a famous case decided by U.S. Supreme 
Court, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 17.  See infra Parts II–III.  
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that the Casey Court upheld a Pennsylvania law requiring a minor to 
obtain parental consent before an abortion.18 
The reason national courts cite U.S. and German cases is to justi-
fy their decisions in light of national politics and to legitimize their 
opinions in a national context.19  As part of this justification and legit-
imation, courts draw on comparative law to join an international con-
versation about how modern countries balance competing rights.20  
For example, language from an opinion recently decided by the Con-
stitutional Court of Portugal reveals that court’s concern with popu-
lar, national attitudes opposed to abortion.21 Thus, in its opinion, the 
court upheld legislation that marked a major change in the country’s 
abortion law, but framed the legislation as responsive, in part, to the 
same concerns that were before the FCC in 1993.22 
Contributing to a rich literature on comparative constitutional-
ism and globalization,23 this Article explores how and why courts and 
                                                          
 18.  See infra Parts I.A, II.B. 
 19.  See infra Part II.  This Article does not consider the oft-debated question of wheth-
er national courts should borrow from the decisions of foreign judicial bodies, or how 
much weight courts should give to foreign experience.  For an analysis of those issues in 
the context of U.S. and German abortion law, see Myra Marx Ferree & William A. Gamson, 
The Gendering of Governance and the Governance of Gender: Abortion Politics in Germany and the 
USA, in RECOGNITION STRUGGLES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CONTESTED IDENTITIES, 
AGENCY AND POWER 35, 39 (Barbara Hobson ed., 2003) (examining U.S. abortion law in 
light of German abortion law and noting the implications for the development of U.S. 
law); Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should Americans 
Pay Attention?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (1994) (questioning how societies 
with similar constitutional values have reached “radically different constitutional posi-
tions”); Neuman, supra note 3 at 289, 293–300, 314 (examining “[t]he German [l]aw in an 
American [l]ight” and focusing on the comparative roles of “positive rights and state du-
ties” and courts and legislatures of the United States and Germany). 
 20.  Reva Siegel recently noted the way in which modern constitutional frameworks for 
abortion draw from U.S. and German approaches to balance the rights of women and fe-
tuses.  Reva B. Siegel, The Constitutionalization of Abortion, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1057, 1057–58 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajo 
eds., 2012) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutionalization of Abortion]. 
 21.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, Relator: Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, 23.02.2010, 60, 
DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2.ª SÉRIE [D.R.], 26.03.2010, 15566, 15582–83 (Por.) (translation 
provided by Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author).   
 22.  See infra Part II.C. 
 23.  See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, 
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 19–21 (David 
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lawyers rely on a particular formulation of comparative law as evi-
dence of modern and universal trends in abortion law reform. It also 
assesses the consequences of this comparative methodology.  Legisla-
tive acts or judicial decisions that appear to add to or expand legal 
grounds for abortion may not necessarily correspond with better or 
more extensive health care services; Germany and the United States 
are good examples.24  State laws in the United States ban certain pro-
cedures, mandate special standards for licensing and facilities, require 
counseling and waiting periods, and limit funding for abortion ser-
vices in public programs (and, more recently, in private insurance 
plans).25  The legal and liability pressures on health care providers, 
the rising costs of services, and social stigma limit the availability of 
abortion services for many U.S. women.26 
German women, by contrast, can terminate pregnancies after 
submitting to counseling, the requirements of which vary in tone and 
by region.27  Although the 1993 FCC decision reiterated that abortion 
is an unlawful act, proof of counseling before the twelfth week of 
pregnancy suspends criminal punishment.28  Women know which 
counseling centers to contact depending on their need for minimal, 
though legally compliant, counseling.29  In addition, state welfare 
funds cover almost all of the country’s abortions.30  Present applica-
                                                          
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (analyzing three time periods when “legal institu-
tional and conceptual change” developed alongside global economic change); Heinz 
Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World Constitutional-
ism,” 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 597–99 (evaluating the place of the U.S. Constitution in the 
constitutional development of other countries); Sally Engle Merry, New Legal Realism and 
the Ethnography of Transnational Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 975, 975–77 (2006) (examin-
ing “new legal realism” through the lens “of the use of human rights in the international 
movement against violence against women”). 
 24.  See infra Part III. 
 25.  See infra Part III.A; see also Emily Bazelon, The Reincarnation of Pro-Life, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., May 27, 2011, at MM13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/ 
magazine/the-reincarnation-of-pro-life.html (describing the types and prevalence of anti-
abortion legislation). 
 26.  See infra Part III.A. 
 27.  See infra Part III.B. 
 28.  See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See infra notes 269–276 and accompanying text. 
 30.  See infra notes 277–285 and accompanying text. 
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tion of the law has led some to argue that Germany, in effect, permits 
abortion for any reason.31 
Briefs penned by women’s rights advocates and cited by national 
courts illustrate how comparative examples provide support for the 
dominant rights-based approach to abortion.32  These briefs, and the 
court decisions that borrow from them, transplant examples from 
Western Europe and North America for the sake of modernity and 
progress.  This comparative method may perpetuate what Karen Knop 
has described as a “soft form[] of imperialism.”33  Activists’ and courts’ 
focus on rights to legal decisionmaking, however, reifies a formalist 
understanding of comparative constitutional law that makes it diffi-
cult to see the consequences and practices, both before and after law 
reform.  In the context of abortion, the prevailing comparative meth-
odology provides little opportunity for courts, advocates, and scholars 
to compare how states tolerate both formal and informal practices.34 
A different approach, which might be loosely labeled as “com-
parative pragmatism,”35 also has important implications for women’s 
                                                          
 31.  See infra Part III.B; see also Elizabeth Crighton & Martina Ebert, RU 486 and Abortion 
Practices in Europe: From Legalization to Access, 24 WOMEN & POL. 13, 25–26 (2001) (evaluat-
ing the current state of abortion law in Germany and concluding “that the current law 
takes an ambivalent position on abortion”). 
 32.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 33.  Knop, supra note 16, at 76. 
 34.  See infra Part IV.B.  In this vein, Annelise Riles issued a challenge for comparative 
theory generally: “Rather than attempting to relate global and local spheres of legality, to 
somehow tie them up in one grand comparative scheme, we might take on the somewhat 
less grandiose task of describing and understanding actual artifacts of transnational legali-
ty . . . .”  Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 277 (1999). 
 35.  Although I use the word “pragmatism” in a conversational sense, theories of legal 
pragmatism have attracted varied scholarly attention.  For contemporary examples in 
American legal theory, see Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics 
Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2071–72 (1996) (describing legal pragmatists as “embracing a 
wide variety of ideologies from neotraditionalism to feminism to critical race theory” who 
reject formalism and “attempts to ground legal doctrine in terms of one overarching social 
policy or ‘grand theory’”); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. 
L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1988) (describing legal pragmatism as “solving legal problems using 
every tool that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and social poli-
cy”); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal 
Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 173–81 (2004) (describing “[t]he basic background 
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rights advocates based in the global North, in particular in the United 
States.  A comparative analysis that focuses less on constitutional case 
law and more on public health concerns can challenge the pervasive 
and encompassing focus on the recognition of formal rights.36  In 
countries like Colombia and South Africa, for example, reform strate-
gies might contemplate the availability of health care resources, the 
relative power of the state to enforce abortion laws, and the existence 
of informal networks for obtaining abortion services.  This restyled 
comparative inquiry might elicit solutions that fit with diverse com-
munity needs, deter counter-movements against liberalization, and 
encourage flexible strategies that align with the relative power of the 
state at issue.  This type of comparative pragmatism would also con-
tradict the prevalent misconception—particularly abroad—that Roe 
currently provides U.S. women with abortion on demand. 
This Article has four parts.  Part I will summarize the cases in the 
United States and Germany that are the frequent sources of compari-
son.  Part II will describe patterns in the legal reasoning of recent de-
cisions from Colombia, South Africa, Portugal, and Mexico.37  Alt-
hough these decisions come from different courts in different 
countries, they all rely on a similar comparative myth: the United 
States and Germany are ends on a spectrum and share certain over-
lapping concerns for women’s rights and fetal rights.  Part III will ex-
plain why the comparators—the United States and Germany—are 
misunderstood proxies for permissive or restrictive legal regimes, re-
spectively.  In particular, this Part will show how abortion services are 
restricted in the United States and relatively accessible in Germany.  
Finally, Part IV will consider what courts and advocates may miss be-
cause of their focus on expanding the legal grounds for abortion. 
I.  THE COMPARATORS: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 
Before discussing a set of high-profile foreign cases decided in 
the last ten years, a brief description of the law from which the com-
parisons are drawn is helpful.  This Part introduces relevant U.S. and 
German case law. 
                                                          
premises of Legal Pragmatism [as] Citizen Perspective, Associative Democracy, and the 
Priority of Solutions”). 
 36.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 37.  Part II will also briefly discuss cases decided by courts in Spain and Nepal. 
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A.  The United States: Roe and Casey 
Abortion law and practice in the United States has been in a state 
of change since 1973 when the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided Roe v. Wade.  This Section could not possibly cover the extent 
to which abortion law and practice has evolved, or the voluminous 
writing on the subject.38  As will be discussed in more detail in Part III, 
state legislatures and the federal government have passed a variety of 
laws that shape abortion provision and access.  This Section does, 
however, provide a brief summary of the relevant portions of the con-
stitutional cases often cited by foreign courts: Roe and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 
In Roe, the Supreme Court held that criminal laws banning abor-
tion were an infringement of a constitutional right to privacy.39  Ac-
cording to the Court, women, in consultation with their physicians, 
could elect to have an abortion for any reason during the first tri-
mester.40  In the second trimester, a state could “regulate the abortion 
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.”41  
In the last trimester, a state, “in promoting its interest in the potenti-
ality of human life [could], if it cho[se], regulate, and even proscribe, 
                                                          
 38.  See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 3, 9–10 
(1984) (discussing how individuals form their opinions about abortion and analyzing how 
those opinions have contributed to “the reemergence of abortion as a political and moral 
issue”); THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
MOTHERHOOD 11–14 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (collecting essays as an introduction 
to various issues of reproductive justice); LAWRENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF 
ABSOLUTES 3 (1992) (discussing abortion as a “clash” between life and liberty); WHAT ROE 
V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST 
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (discussing abortion jurisprudence 
through a collection of hypothetical rewrites of Roe v. Wade). 
 39.  410 U.S. 113, 153, 164–66 (1973). 
 40.  Id. at 164 (“For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the 
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the preg-
nant woman’s attending physician.”).  More than ten years before Roe, the American Law 
Institute called for the legalization of abortion on the grounds of danger to mental or 
physical health, rape, and grave fetal anomaly, as determined by a physician.  Linda 
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 
120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2037 (2011). 
 41.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
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abortion except where it [was] necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”42 
Immediately following Roe, legislation and litigation tested the 
trimester framework.  The Supreme Court upheld several federal and 
state restrictions on abortion43 but also struck down state laws that lim-
ited access to abortions.44  For example, the Supreme Court held un-
constitutional informed consent requirements that attempted to dis-
suade women from obtaining abortions.45 
In 1992, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey preserved constitutional protection 
for abortion, but rejected Roe’s trimester framework and gave states 
much more discretion to restrict access to abortion and to extend 
                                                          
 42.  Id. at 164–65. 
 43.  See generally Nancy Ford, The Evolution of a Constitutional Right to an Abortion: Fash-
ioned in the 1970s and Secured in the 1980s, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 271 (1983) (tracing the evolu-
tion of U.S. abortion law in the 1970s and early 1980s); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 192–99 (1991) (upholding against a First Amendment challenge the federal govern-
ment’s refusal to allow family planning funds to be used for counseling and other speech 
related to abortion); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506 (1990) 
(upholding “an Ohio statute that, with certain exceptions, prohibit[ed] any person from 
performing an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated, minor woman absent notice to 
one of the woman’s parents or a court order of approval”); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417, 497 (1990) (upholding a two-parent notice requirement in a Minnesota statute 
that included an alternative judicial bypass procedure); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 
492 U.S. 490, 504–09, 516–17 (1989) (upholding a Missouri statute that contained a pre-
amble defining life at conception, required physicians to ascertain point of viability, and 
barred abortion in state facilities or performed by state employees); Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297, 301, 326 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the federal 
government from funding “certain medically necessary abortion”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 473–74, 480 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut regulation providing state Medicaid 
benefits for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions). 
 44.  See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
759–69 (1986) (striking down requirements for informed consent, record-keeping, and 
techniques designed to protect post-viability fetuses), overruled by Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–82 (1992); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. 
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 437–39, 448–49 (1983) (striking down a state hospitalization re-
quirement for second trimester abortions and informed consent measures intended to 
dissuade women from abortion), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–82; Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67–75 (1976) (striking down spousal 
and parental consent requirements). 
 45.  Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764; City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 448–49. 
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protections for fetal life.46  In addition, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter determined that states could restrict abortion so long as 
the states did not create an “undue burden” on women’s choice to 
have an abortion.47  The Justices described an undue burden as “a 
state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonvia-
ble fetus.”48  A majority of the Court, however, held that the state has 
an interest in protecting women’s health and in respecting fetal life 
throughout a woman’s pregnancy.49  The plurality noted that after vi-
ability, the state could proscribe abortion except when pregnancy 
threatened “the life or health of the mother.”50  Based on this analysis, 
the plurality upheld Pennsylvania’s requirements for parental consent 
for a minor’s abortion,51 record keeping and reporting to the state,52 
informed consent,53 and a twenty-four-hour waiting period.54  The on-
ly provision of the Pennsylvania law that the plurality struck down as 
imposing an undue burden on the right to pre-viability abortion was a 
spousal notice requirement.55 
Casey’s undue burden test has justified laws that make abortion 
logistically and financially more difficult for many U.S. women to ob-
tain.56 For example Casey has justified state laws that restrict provider 
practices and impose counseling or other requirements on patients 
that are unique to abortion.57  Some scholars question whether Casey’s 
                                                          
 46.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–46, 872–76.  Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion, 
in which Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter joined.  Id. at 843. 
 47.  Id. at 874. 
 48.  Id. at 877. 
 49.  Id. at 846. 
 50.  Id. at 879 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–165 (1973)). 
 51.  Id. at 899. 
 52.  Id. at 900–01. 
 53.  Id. at 883.  Interestingly, this provision provided women with information that 
might lead “the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 886–87. 
 55.  Id. at 898.  But see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Re-
strictions under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1735–36, 1773–80 (2008) (noting the 
shifting rhetoric in Casey to women’s dignity, liberty, autonomy, and equality). 
 56.  See infra Part III.A. 
 57.  See Scott Woodcock, Abortion Counseling and the Informed Consent Dilemma, 25 
BIOETHICS 495, 496–98 (2011) (distinguishing informed consent standards for abortion 
versus for other medical procedures). 
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undue burden test has any teeth at all, or whether it is merely a “rea-
sonableness” standard that poses few obstacles to state regulation.58 
Although not cited by the foreign court decisions described in 
this Article, the Supreme Court’s latest word on abortion in Gonzales 
v. Carhart59 provides a snapshot of how the jurisprudence of the Su-
preme Court has evolved.60  In Carhart, the Court upheld a federal law 
that barred physicians from using an abortion method clinically de-
scribed as intact dilation and evacuation (“intact D&E”), but referred 
to as partial-birth abortion by abortion opponents.61  Applying Casey’s 
undue burden standard, the Court held that the federal law did not 
have to include an exception for women’s health.62  In reaching this 
holding, the Court suggested that the law protected not only fetal life, 
but also the integrity of the medical profession,63 and expressed con-
cern for the emotional health of women who may suffer from regret 
once they learned what the intact D&E procedure entailed.64  While 
the trajectory of abortion law in the United States is not uniform, a 
case like Carhart illustrates the Court’s willingness to permit re-
strictions on abortion.65 
                                                          
 58.  See, e.g., David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 538–
39 (2000) (noting that the “undue burden” test is extremely deferential because it “turn[s] 
more frankly on the Court’s assessment of . . . ‘reasonableness’”). 
 59.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 60.  For other examples of post-Casey case law, see Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. 
New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–32 (2006) (explaining that, if possible, lower courts 
should sever from a statute any potentially unconstitutional provision regulating minors’ 
access to abortion in medical emergencies); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974 
(1997) (per curiam) (acknowledging that “performance of abortions may be restricted to 
physicians”); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 266–68 (1993) 
(holding that a federal law prohibiting private conspiracies to deprive people of civil rights 
does not apply to conspiracies to close abortion clinics). 
 61.  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 136–37, 168. 
 62.  Id. at 156–67.  In brief, the Court stated that other safe procedures were available 
to women who might otherwise have intact D&Es and that whether the procedure was 
necessary to protect women’s health was contested by the medical profession.  Id. at 158, 
162–65.  The Court also dismissed claims that the federal law was vague or overbroad.  Id. 
at 148–50. 
 63.  Id. at 160. 
 64.  Id. at 159–60. 
 65.  See Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories 
of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1514, 1519 (2008) (arguing that Carhart “broaden[ed] the range of state interests that can 
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B.  Germany: The 1975 and 1993 FCC Decisions 
In 1975, the FCC handed down a decision that reflected a differ-
ent approach than the one expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Roe v. Wade.66  The FCC was well aware of abortion politics and juris-
prudence in the United States.67  And, in a sense, the FCC’s rejection 
of Roe captures the contrasting nature of U.S. and German case law.68  
The court acknowledged that the laws of “other democratic countries 
of the Western World . . . have been ‘liberalized’ or ‘modernized,’” 
but differentiated West German legal standards and history.69  In par-
ticular, the court held that the rights to life and dignity that buttress 
Germany’s Basic Law were informed by the gross abuses of the totali-
tarian National Socialist Party, “a political regime to which the indi-
vidual life meant little.”70 
In its 1975 decision, the FCC struck down amendments to the 
German Penal Code that permitted abortion until the twelfth week of 
pregnancy after pro-childbirth counseling and after twelve weeks in 
cases of medical necessity or serious fetal anomaly.71  The court held 
                                                          
justify limiting reproductive decisions”).  For a study of post-Casey decisions from various 
federal courts, see Linda J. Wharton, Sue Frietsche, & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving the Core of 
Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 353–85 
(2006). 
 66.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 
39 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, translated in Jonas 
& Gorby, supra note 7, at 605–84.  I refer to this case as “the 1975 FCC decision.” 
 67.  See id. at 667 (von Brünneck, J., dissenting) (observing that “the Supreme Court of 
the United States has even regarded punishment for the interruption of pregnancy [in the 
first trimester] as a violation of fundamental rights”); Kommers, supra note 19, at 9 (con-
tending that the German court’s “pronouncement diverged radically from the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s refusal in Roe v. Wade to say when life begins”). 
 68.  See Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the Application of German 
Abortion Laws, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009) (noting that U.S. and German 
abortion law have been treated as mirror images of each other). 
 69.  39 BVERFGE 1 (57), Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 661–62. 
 70.  Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 637–38. 
 71.  Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 609–13.  Under the 1974 amendments to the penal 
code, the required counseling was designed to inform women of “the public and private 
assistance available for the pregnant women, mothers and children” and to “facilitate[] the 
continuation of the pregnancy.”  Id. at 612.  The West German Parliament (the Bundes-
tag) amended the penal code by a narrow margin.  MYRA MARX FERREE ET AL., SHAPING 
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that Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law72 protect the inviolability of hu-
man dignity and the right to life and impose positive duties on the 
state to protect the “unborn life” or “developing life.”73  In consider-
ing the rights of women and of “developing life,” the court stated, 
“precedence must be given to the protection of the life of the child 
about to be born.”74  But the FCC held that abortion was not punisha-
ble in exceptional circumstances, such as in instances of an expecta-
                                                          
ABORTION DISCOURSE: DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED 
STATES 34 (2002).  Abortions for medical reasons (threat to a woman’s life or serious im-
pairment of the woman’s health) could be performed any time during the pregnancy.  Jo-
nas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 610.  Abortion for reason of fetal anomaly could be per-
formed up to twenty-two weeks.  Id. at 611.  In June 1974, the FCC issued an order 
suspending enforcement of the law, “although the interruption of pregnancy which [was] 
indicated medically, eugenically or ethically within the first twelve weeks after concep-
tion . . . remain[ed] free of punishment,” until it handed down its decision.  39 BVERFGE 1 
(8), Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 622; see also FERREE ET AL., supra, at 33–34 (discussing 
the political process surrounding abortion legislation in Germany).  Interestingly, the 1974 
legislation struck down by the FCC looks somewhat like the counseling provisions that the 
court mandated two decades later.  See infra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
 72.  Article 1 provides: 
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable.  To respect and protect it shall be the du-
ty of all state authority.  (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviola-
ble and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and 
of justice in the world.  (3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law. 
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I at 1, translated in BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 15 (Christian Tomuschat & Donald P. Currie trans., Deutscher Bundestag, 
2010). 
Article 2 provides: 
(1) Every person shall have the right to the free development of his personality 
insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitu-
tional order or the moral law.  (2) Every person shall have the right to life and 
physical integrity.  Freedom of the person shall be inviolable.  These rights may 
be interfered with only pursuant to a law. 
Id. 
 73.  Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 624. 
 74.  39 BVERFGE 1 (39), Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 628, 643.  The court also noted 
that the penal code was not the only source of protection for unborn life, and that it was 
“the task of the state to employ, in the first instance, social, political, and welfare means for 
securing developing life.”  Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 644. 
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tion of a severe birth defect, a threat to the pregnant women’s life or 
health, a criminal act of rape or incest, or a “general situation of 
need.”75  The FCC defined this last ground, also called the “social in-
dication,” as “conflicts of such difficulty that, beyond a definite meas-
ure, a sacrifice by the pregnant woman in favor of the unborn life 
cannot be compelled.”76  The following year, in 1976, the West Ger-
man Parliament codified as grounds for legal abortion the reasons of 
maternal health and life, fetal malformation, rape or incest, and gen-
eral situation of need.77 
Almost all West German women seeking abortion after the 1975 
decision relied on the social indication exception.78  In other words, 
                                                          
 75.   39 BVERFGE 1 (43–44), Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 648; see also Neuman, supra 
note 3, at 275 (writing that the FCC approved an exception from the general prohibition 
on abortion “for a ‘general situation of need . . . when continuation of the pregnancy 
would impose extreme hardship on the woman”). 
 76.  39 BVERFGE 1 (44–45); Jonas & Gorby, supra note 66, at 648. 
 77.  Fünftzehnten Strafrechtsänderungsgestzes [Fifteenth Penal Law Amendment Act], 
May 18, 1976, BGBl. I at 1213 [hereinafter 1976 Act] (translation provided by author).  
Under the 1976 Act, grounds for legal termination were: (1) “to avert a danger  to [the] 
life [of the pregnant woman] or the danger of a serious prejudice to her physical or men-
tal health, provided that the danger cannot be averted in any other way which she can rea-
sonably be expected to bear”; (2) if, “as a result of a genetic trait or harmful influence pri-
or to birth, the child would suffer from an incurable injury to its health which is so serious 
that the pregnant woman cannot be required to continue the pregnancy”; (3) if the preg-
nant woman was the victim of rape or incest; or (4) “to avert the threat of a distress which 
(a) is so serious that the pregnant woman cannot be required to continue her pregnancy,  
and (b) cannot be averted in another way she can reasonably be expected to bear.”  Brug-
gemann v. Germany, No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244 (1981) (quoting the 1976 Act, 
BGBl. I at 1213, art. 218(a), available at http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org 
/document.php?DocumentID=2033.  For the ground of fetal anomaly, abortion was per-
missible before twenty-two weeks.  For grounds of criminal act and general situation of 
need, abortion was permissible before twelve weeks.  Id. 
 78.  See FERREE ET AL., supra note 71, at 37 (“Under the 1976 law, more than 80% of 
legal abortions were carried out under the social need exception to the prohibition.”); 
Udo Werner, The Convergence of Abortion Regulation in Germany and the United States: A Cri-
tique of Glendon’s Rights Talk Thesis, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 571, 594–95 (1996) 
(“West German abortion practice was characterized by an extensive utilization of the ‘so-
cial indication’ justification and abortion tourism.”); see also Neuman, supra note 3, at 276 
(“[I]mplementation [of legislation after 1975] varied regionally in West Germany in ac-
cordance with political and religious differences, leading women to travel within Germany, 
as well as to the Netherlands, for abortions.”).  This is not to discount the prosecutions of 
  
100 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:85 
the 1975 decision did not translate into an insurmountable obstacle 
to abortion access.79  Over eighty percent of women seeking an abor-
tion qualified on the ground of “general situation of need,” and in 
practice “almost every pregnant woman [in West Germany] could ob-
tain an indication [of general situation of need] if she did so with de-
termination.”80  Stated differently, a high number of legal termina-
tions characterized the practice of abortion in West Germany after the 
mid-1970s.81 
In East Germany, women could obtain abortion on request dur-
ing the first trimester.82  One of the most controversial tasks of the 
post-unification German Bundestag (“Parliament”) was to harmonize 
the abortion laws of West and East Germany.83  In 1992, Parliament 
amended the penal code and decriminalized abortion until the 
twelfth week of gestation if accompanied with non-directive, non-
persuasive, counseling, and a three-day waiting period.84  The purpose 
                                                          
women under the 1976 Act.  Although prosecutions had already fallen dramatically by 
1969, estimates from the years after the 1976 Act and before the new legislation in 1994 
suggest that there were around 170 prosecutions for illegal abortions a year.  FERREE ET 
AL., supra note 71, at 28, 37.  Moreover, some women who traveled to the Netherlands to 
obtain abortions were stopped at the German-Dutch border and forced to have gynecolog-
ical exams.  Id. at 38. 
 79.  See Werner, supra note 78, at 600 (documenting the rise in abortions in Germany 
in the years following the 1975 FCC decision). 
 80.  Ferree & Gamson, supra note 19, at 41 (reporting that “approximately 90 percent 
of all legal abortions were done [under social necessity]”); Neuman, supra note 3, at 276; 
see also supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 81.  FERREE ET AL., supra note 71, at 38 (estimating that two-thirds of all abortions were 
illegal under the 1976 Act, based on the disparity between the number of claims for abor-
tion procedures submitted to insurance companies and the official “number of legally reg-
istered abortions”). 
 82.  See id. at 33 (writing that in 1972 the East German legislature legalized abortion 
during the first trimester and that “[a]bortion was . . . available at no cost”). 
 83.  Id. at 40–43. 
 84.  Gesetz zum Schutz des vorgeburtlichen/werdenden Lebens, zur Föderung einer 
kinderfreundlicheren Gesellscharft, für Hilfen im Schwangerschaftskonflict un zur Rege-
lung des Schwangershcaftsabbruchs [Schwangeren- und Familienhilfegesetz] [Pregnancy 
and Family Assistance Act], July 27, 1992, BGBl. I at 1398, § 218a, excerpts translated in 
World Health Organization, Human Reproduction and Population Policies, 43 INT’L DIG. 
HEALTH LEGIS. 737, 740–45 (1992) [hereinafter 43 INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS.].  The legis-
lation, discussed further in Part III.B, set out regulations for a new counseling regime and 
replaced §§ 218–219d of the German Penal Code.  The legislation was accompanied by 
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of the counseling was to “place the pregnant woman in a position to 
make her own responsible decision in accordance with her con-
science,” as well as to “protect life by means of advice and help.”85  
The post-unification Parliament intended this legislation to “solve[] 
the problem [of] using the ‘backdoor’ [of general need] provided in 
the 1975 ruling.”86  In addition, the 1992 legislation permitted legal 
abortion “to prevent a threat to the life of the pregnant woman or a 
threat of serious injury to her physical or mental health,” and for rea-
sons of severe fetal anomaly before the twenty-second week of preg-
nancy.87  Finally, the 1992 legislation suspended punishment for abor-
tions before twenty-two weeks of pregnancy if the woman was “in a 
state of particular distress.”88 
In a 1993 decision, the FCC reinforced the constitutional protec-
tion of fetal life and the conditional nature of women’s rights to end a 
pregnancy under Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law.89  Weighing the 
constitutional protections of “unborn life” against the competing 
rights of pregnant women, the court struck down the legislative provi-
sions decriminalizing early abortion and providing for non-directive 
counseling.90  The FCC repeated its holding that the state had a posi-
tive duty to protect fetal life, but it also held that the state could not 
                                                          
statutory revisions to the health insurance code (permitting coverage for abortions with 
counseling).  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 
1993, 88 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203 (214–18) 
(Ger.) (translation provided by author). 
 85.  Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act, BGBl. I at 1403, § 219(1), 43 INT’L DIG. 
HEALTH LEGIS., supra note 84, at 744. 
 86.  Werner, supra note 78, at 595 (“The [FCC] solved the problem [of reconciling the 
legal standpoint with the social reality] by using the ‘backdoor’ provided in the 1975 rul-
ing on abortion.”); see also Kommers, supra note 19, at 12–14 (noting that the German Par-
liament drafted the law with the 1975 decision in mind). 
 87.  Terminations for reason of fetal anomaly had to be coupled with counseling and a 
three-day waiting period.  Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act, BGBl. I, at 1402, 
§ 218a(2)–(3), 43 INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS., supra note 84, at 743. 
 88.  Id. § 218a(4), 43 INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS., supra note 84, at 743. 
 89.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 
88 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203 (208–09) (trans-
lation provided by author).  I refer to this as “the 1993 FCC decision.” 
 90.  Id. at 238–43.  Interestingly, the 1993 FCC decision mentions the United States 
once, arguing that the lack of criminal prohibition in the United States provides no legal 
method of curbing practices like sex selection.  Id. at 239. 
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place unreasonable demands on pregnant women.91  Thus, the court 
determined that the law must allow legal abortion for reason of seri-
ous danger to or impairment of the life or health of the pregnant 
woman, criminal acts like rape or incest, and if grave birth defects 
were expected.92  In the place of the social indication or general situa-
tion of need, the FCC held that “unevaluated” abortion, or abortion 
performed after dissuasive or pro-childbirth counseling, would re-
main unlawful, but would not be prosecuted or punished.93 
Thus, the FCC conceived of counseling, administered by state-
regulated centers, as the vehicle for women to avoid state prosecution 
for abortions without physician approval.94  The FCC held that state-
licensed counseling centers must provide counseling that encourages 
women to carry the pregnancy to term and deters women from choos-
ing abortion.95  The court cautioned that professionals who deliver 
counseling should help rather than judge women, and that counsel-
ing should not be manipulative or seek to indoctrinate women with a 
particular worldview.96  Thus, the court noted that counseling could 
                                                          
 91.  Id. at 234 (noting, in reliance on the 1975 FCC decision, that abortions to save the 
life of a pregnant woman, to protect a pregnant woman’s health, to prevent grave fetal 
anomaly, and in cases of a criminal act against a woman continue to present extreme situa-
tions in which women’s rights outweigh fetal rights under the Basic Law). 
 92.  Id. at 256.  Revisions to the penal code indirectly incorporated a eugenic indica-
tion by permitting abortion “to avert a danger to life or the danger of a grave impairment 
of the physical or emotional state of health of the pregnant woman.”  Strafgesetzbuch 
[StGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBl. I, § 218a(2) (Ger.), translated in STEPHEN 
THAMAN, THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE GERMAN PENAL CODE AS 
AMENDED AS OF DECEMBER 19, 2001, at 131 (2002). 
 93.  88 BVERFGE 203 (210–11, 270–73) (determining that terminations for social need 
or material hardship would not be punishable, but also that such terminations could not 
be exempt from the penal code). 
 94.  Id. at 267–68.  The FCC reasoned that criminal law was a relatively ineffective tool 
for reducing the number of abortions, but that counseling could deter abortion.  Id. at 
265–67. 
 95.  Id. at 270–72, 283–84 (“[Counseling] should help [a woman] make a responsible 
and conscientious decision.  In the process, the woman must be aware of the fact that, in 
every stage of pregnancy, the unborn has an independent right to life even vis-à-vis her, 
and thus, according to the legal system, pregnancy termination can only be considered in 
exceptional situations where bearing the child to term would place the woman under a 
burden which . . . is so severe and exceptional that it exceeds the limits of exactable sacri-
fice.” (translation provided by author)). 
 96.  Id. at 283. 
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be “open-ended but not open goal.”97  As described by the FCC, 
“[c]ounseling serves to protect unborn life [and] has to be guided by 
the effort to encourage the woman to continue the pregnancy and 
open up perspectives to her for a life with the child.”98  Moreover, the 
FCC held that the national health insurance scheme would not pay 
for terminations with counseling.99  In cases of economic hardship, 
however, the court indicated social assistance benefits may cover ter-
mination costs.100 
The revised Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act of 1995 de-
scribes the requirements of counseling, which include providing in-
formation on contraceptive methods, family benefits, support for 
pregnant women, and risks of abortion.101  The Act directs counselors 
to ask women their reasons for seeking an abortion and to protect 
women’s anonymity.  It obliges the state to certify counselors and to 
make counseling available broadly, and it requires a three-day waiting 
period between counseling and abortion services.102 
As will be explained in the next Part, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in Roe and Casey, and the 1975 and 1993 FCC decisions have 
had enormous influence on the constitutional decisions of a diverse 
group of national courts.  These national court decisions do not, 
however, engage with the implications and evolution of abortion ju-
risprudence in the United States or Germany.  Indeed, these opinions 
at times misinterpret U.S. and German law.  Yet national courts cite 
comparative examples from the United States and Germany to justify 
their positions with respect to abortion and to communicate how 
                                                          
 97.  See FERREE ET AL., supra note 71, at 42 (describing the “goal-oriented” mandate 
that counseling protect life, but remain “‘outcome-open’ in style,” as the “most ambiguous 
part” of the court’s decision).  
 98.  88 BVERFGE 203 (210) (translation provided by author). 
 99.  Id. at 312–19. 
 100.  Id. at 241. 
 101.  Schwangeren- und Familienhilfeänderungsgesetz [SFHÄndG] [Assistance to 
Pregnant Women and Families Amendment Law], Aug. 21, 1995, BGBl. I at 1050, § 219 
(Ger.), excerpts translated in World Health Organization, Human Reproduction and Population 
Policies, 47 INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 34, 34–35 (1996) [hereinafter 47 INT’L DIG. HEALTH 
LEGIS.]. 
 102.  See id. § 219(2), 47 INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS., supra note 101, at 35 (discussing cer-
tification of counselors); see also Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, 
BGBl. I, § 218a(1)1 (Ger.), THAMAN, supra note 92, at 131, 133 (2002) (discussing the 
three-day waiting period and the current certification provision). 
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their countries fit with or resist what the courts describe as an emerg-
ing, global acceptance of reproductive rights. 
II.  COMPARATIVE LAW IN CONTEMPORARY ABORTION DECISIONS 
This Part reviews decisions in which courts exercise their power 
to broaden the grounds for abortion or courts uphold legislative acts 
that decriminalize early abortion for any reason.  Each court’s attempt 
to balance competing rights reveals a particular aspect of comparative 
abortion law at work: setting out a middle ground,103 identifying with 
approaches at the ends of the spectrum from criminalization to liber-
alization,104 and repackaging old comparisons in new cases.105  Despite 
the differences in countries and cases, each court applies a similar, 
formalist-comparative reasoning that depends little on the specific so-
cial, political, and economic characteristics of the comparators of the 
United States and Germany. 
This Part does not present the finer details of comparative consti-
tutional analysis, which is the project of varied and important scholar-
ship.  Rather, it provides only the background information necessary 
to understand the context in which courts cite comparative law.  The 
goal of this Part is to reveal the patterns in court decisions,106 not to 
wrestle with variations in legislative language, judicial review powers, 
or courts’ methods of constitutional and statutory interpretation.  In-
deed, the fact that these countries’ governments and legal systems 
vary widely makes the consistency of the courts’ comparative exam-
ples, even in dicta, all the more striking. 
A.  Identifying Common Ground: Colombia 
A 2006 decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia cited 
comparative abortion law in an opinion that overturned the country’s 
                                                          
 103.  See infra Part II.A. 
 104.  See infra Part II.B–C. 
 105.  See infra Part D. 
 106.  Of course, some courts have declined to cite comparative law in ruling on modern 
abortion laws.  See, e.g., Ústavný súd Slovenskej republiky 04.12.2007 [Constitutional 
Court], č.1-PL.US 12/01 (Slovk.), translated in CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC, FINDINGS AND RULINGS 2007: ON ABORTION, http://portal.concourt.sk/Zbierka 
/2007a/1_07a.pdf. (upholding legislation allowing abortion on request during the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy). 
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criminal ban on abortion.107  The decision provides a description of 
what the court sees as a global consensus on minimum grounds for 
abortion, and distinguishes the outliers of Germany (criminalization) 
and the United States (abortion by request).108  In balancing the 
rights of women and potential life, the decision casts Colombian law 
as the middle ground between the U.S. and German approaches. 
The Constitutional Court struck down the criminal ban on abor-
tion and legalized terminations in three instances: (1) when continua-
tion of the pregnancy would put the woman’s mental or physical 
health or life at risk; (2) when serious malformations of the fetus 
would make it non-viable outside of the uterus; and (3) when preg-
nancy is the result of rape, incest, unwanted artificial insemination, or 
unwanted implantation of a fertilized ovum.109  The court’s decision 
relied heavily on comparative and international human rights law.110  
The court held that the Constitution of Colombia required it to bal-
ance the competing interests of women and “unborn life” in accord-
ance with the principle of proportionality.111  Rights subject to balanc-
ing are defined in part by a “constitutional bundle,” which includes 
                                                          
 107.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Plena mayo 10, 2006, 
Sentencia C-355/2006 (pp. 299–300) (Colom.), available at http://www.corte 
constitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/c-355-06.htm, excerpts translated in C-355/2006 
EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 6. 
 108.  Id. at 276–82, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 48. 
 109.  Id. at 293, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 61.  In three earlier cases (de-
cided in 1994, 1997, and 2000), the court upheld the criminal ban on abortion but ex-
panded the ability of courts to decline to punish women whose abortions had been moti-
vated by rape or other extreme circumstances.  See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS & 
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES SCHOOL OF LAW, BODIES ON TRIAL: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN 
LATIN AMERICAN COURTS 67–68 & nn.256–58 (2003), available at http://reproductive 
rights.org/en/document/bodies-on-trial-reproductive-rights-in-latin-american-courts 
(summarizing litigation preceding C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006). 
 110.  C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006 (pp. 235–49, 276–80), C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra 
note 12, at 23–32, 48; see id. (p. 218), C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 14–15 (not-
ing plaintiffs’ reliance on the Constitution of Colombia, specifically, articles 1 (dignity), 11 
(life), 12 (bodily integrity), 13 (equality and liberty), 42 (deciding number of children), 
and 49 (health)). 
 111.  Id. at 271–75, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 46–48; Verónica Undurraga 
& Rebecca J. Cook, Constitutional Incorporation of International and Comparative Human Rights 
Law: The Colombian Constitutional Court Decision C-355/2006, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: 
GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 215, 219–20 (Susan H. Wil-
liams ed., 2009). 
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Colombia’s obligations under its own constitution and international 
human rights treaties.112 
Rejecting the argument that international human rights law sup-
ports a right to life at conception, the Constitutional Court stated that 
“women’s sexual and reproductive rights have finally been recognized 
as human rights, and as such, they have become part of constitutional 
rights, which are the fundamental basis of all democratic states.”113  
These rights recognize and promote “gender equality in particular, 
and the emancipation of women and girls [as] essential to society.”114  
The court explained that denying women access to abortion on the 
grounds of threat to life or physical or mental health, fetal malfor-
mation, and rape, incest, or unwanted artificial reproductive technol-
ogy impairs a woman’s dignity by making the woman “a mere recepta-
cle for the fetus.”115 
The Colombian Constitutional Court also noted that interna-
tional human rights law does not explicitly prohibit states from crimi-
nalizing abortion.116  The court acknowledged that the treatment of 
abortion in Latin and Central America was mixed.  Countries includ-
ing Argentina, Bolivia, and Cuba allow abortion only if there is a 
threat to the woman’s life or health or in the case of rape.117  Moreo-
                                                          
 112.  C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006 (pp. 235–41, 269–71), C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra 
note 12, at 23–25, 44–46; see Undurraga & Cook, supra note 111, at 226 (describing the 
Constitutional Court’s adoption of a “constitutional bundle,” which is “the expansion of 
the idea of the constitution from a formal constitutional text to an idea of a constitutional 
fabric by a weaving of different sources”); see also C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006 (p. 218), C-
355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 15 (citing article 93 of the Colombian Constitution, 
which outlines Colombia’s “obligations under international human rights law”); Martha I. 
Morgan, Emancipatory Equality: Gender Jurisprudence Under the Colombian Constitution, in THE 
GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 75, 77–80 (Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-
Marin eds., 2005) (explaining the influence of international law on Colombian constitu-
tional law). 
 113.  C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006 (pp. 238, 241, 248), C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 
12, at 24, 31. 
 114.  Id. at. 249, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 32. 
 115.  Id. at 284–85, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 50; see Undurraga & Cook, 
supra note 107, at 239 (noting that the Constitutional Court determined that “[a] total ban 
on abortion . . . reduces a woman to be a mere receptacle of developing life”). 
 116.  C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006 (p. 249), C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 32. 
 117.  Id. at 276–77 & nn.108–11 (citing the relevant provisions of the penal codes of Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, and Cuba). 
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ver, several countries, such as Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras, prohibit abortion in all circumstances.118 
The court, however, did not attempt to justify its approach in 
light of the regional laws that prohibit or substantially restrict abor-
tion.  Rather, the decision identified with cases from comparators out-
side the region and highlighted how North American and Western 
European examples provide evidence of a convergence toward lim-
ited rights to abortion.119  The court explained that, like the constitu-
tions of Western legal regimes, the Colombian Constitution required 
it to weigh the rights of the fetus against those of the pregnant wom-
an.120  Next, the court noted, “[Western judges] have shared common 
ground in affirming that a total prohibition on abortion is unconstitu-
tional because under certain circumstances it imposes an intolerable 
burden on the pregnant woman which infringes upon her constitu-
tional rights.”121  For “purely illustrative” reasons, the majority decision 
relied on cases decided in the United States and Germany, and, to a 
lesser extent, an opinion issued by the Spanish Constitutional Court 
in 1985,122 to illustrate this balancing task.123  Finding a middle ground 
between the two approaches of the United States and Germany, the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia held that even persuasive state in-
terests in life must give way if continued pregnancy results in an ex-
traordinary burden on the woman.124 
In reflecting on U.S. abortion reform, the court cited Roe—the 
“most famous case addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court on the mat-
ter.”125  The Constitutional Court specifically described Roe’s trimester 
                                                          
 118.  Id. at. 277. 
 119.  Id. at 277–82, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 48. 
 120.  Id. at. 276, 283–85, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 48–50.  However, the 
court qualified its remarks by stating it did not “pretend[] to make a description of the 
foreign legislation nor of the jurisprudence of other countries.”  Id. at 276 (translation 
provided by author). 
 121.  Id. at 282, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 48. 
 122.  See Richard Stith, New Constitutional and Penal Theory in Spanish Abortion Law, 35 
AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 513–14, 517–18 (1987) (summarizing a holding from a case decided 
by the Constitutional Court of Spain, T.C., Apr. 11, 1985 (B.J.C., No. 1985-49, p. 515)).  
The 1975 FCC decision from Germany also influenced the approach to fetal life taken in 
the 1985 Spanish decision.  Id. at 513–14 & n.6. 
 123.  C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006, (pp. 277–81), C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, 
at 48. 
 124.  Id. at 281–82, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 48. 
 125.  Id. at 278 (translation provided by author). 
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framework as balancing the privacy rights of women against the state’s 
interest in protecting “unborn life.”126  The court observed the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding from Roe that as pregnancy progresses, the 
state’s interest in “unborn life” becomes stronger, permitting limita-
tions on the right to abortion, except in instances where a woman’s 
life or health is at risk.127  Although noting that Roe was “not the only 
time in which [the U.S. Supreme Court] talked about abortion,”128 the 
Colombian Constitutional Court did not mention that Roe’s trimester 
framework had been repealed and replaced with the undue burden 
standard in Casey.129  Indeed, Casey fundamentally changed how U.S. 
courts balance women’s rights and state interests in fetal life.130 
In addition, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that fetal life 
had independent value and cited the 1975 FCC decision as an exam-
ple of the application of constitutional rights to life and dignity to 
“unborn life.”131  The court emphasized, however, that the FCC did 
not require women to bring a pregnancy to term in instances of an 
“extraordinary and oppressive burden,” a fetal anomaly, a criminal 
act, or a risk to life or health.132 
The court also briefly discussed the 1993 FCC decision.133  Alt-
hough the Colombian court did not describe the holding of the Ger-
man case,134 it cited the 1993 FCC decision as proof that German law 
recognized the “unenforceability of a duty to carry a pregnancy to 
term.”135  Like Casey, the 1993 FCC decision reconfigured the practice 
of abortion.  Rather than focusing on the situations in which contin-
ued pregnancy would be intolerable for women, the FCC suspended 
criminal punishment for terminations preceded by counseling in or-
                                                          
 126.  Id. at 278–79. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 278 (translation provided by author). 
 129.  See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text. 
 130.  See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 131.  C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006, (p. 279) (citing 39 BVERFGE I (Ger.)). 
 132.  Id. at 279 (translation provided by author). 
 133.  Id. at 280, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 48.  The Colombian Constitu-
tional Court incorrectly listed the year of the 1993 FCC decision as 1985.  Id. 
 134.  Id.  The Constitutional Court did note, however, that the law at issue in the FCC 
case permitted women to elect abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy contin-
gent on mandatory counseling.  Id. at 279. 
 135.  Id. at 280 (translation provided by author). 
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der to accommodate broader access to abortion services.136  And, in-
terestingly, the Colombian court’s description ignores one point that 
was fundamental to the FCC’s reasoning: Abortion absent risk to the 
woman’s life or health, criminal act, or fetal anomaly, remained an 
unlawful act.137 
The Colombian Constitutional Court’s description of U.S. and 
German law speaks to a middle ground of permitting abortion on lim-
ited grounds.  According to the court, the United States and Germany 
both balanced women’s rights and fetal rights, but with different out-
comes.  The United States protected women’s privacy and autonomy 
at the expense of fetal recognition, though not without limits.  Ger-
many protected fetal life at the expense of women’s autonomy, 
though not in all circumstances.138  It is notable that the court framed 
the grounds of life, rape, health, fetal abnormality as a compromise 
between these two approaches, even though the present Colombian 
abortion law is much more restrictive than current German abortion 
law.  The court recognized neither a right for women to abortion nor 
a right to life for the unborn, although it did recognize that the fetus 
is entitled to some constitutional protection.139 
Not only does the Colombian Constitutional Court’s description 
oversimplify the respective positions of each comparator,140 it also col-
lapses U.S. and German law into their 1970s iterations.  Countries 
claiming a global consensus on modern abortion law inevitably rely 
on dated conceptions of American and German rights reform.141 
B.  Identifying with the United States: South Africa 
Contemporaneously with the Colombian decision, a court on the 
other side of the world applied similar examples from foreign courts 
for a different purpose.  In upholding a law that permits abortion for 
any reason early in pregnancy, but then imposes restrictions on wom-
en’s decisions as pregnancy progresses, the South African court en-
                                                          
 136.  See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
 137.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text.  
 138.  C.C., Sentencia C-355/2006, (pp. 277–82). 
 139.  Id. at 283, C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 48. 
 140.  See Vicki C. Jackson, Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law, 28 
PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 319, 323–24 (2010) (noting “the complexity of historical context 
and the interdependence of constitutional provisions” as a “challenge[s] that appl[ies] to 
any kind of comparative legal study”). 
 141.  See infra Parts II.B–D, III. 
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gaged comparative law to analogize its position to that of the U.S. Su-
preme Court.142  The Supreme Court of Appeal rooted its opinion in 
women’s rights that were embraced by Roe and rejected by the Ger-
man decisions.143 
Concurrent with the transition from apartheid to democracy, 
South Africa’s abortion law changed radically with the passage of the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (“CTOPA”).144  The CTOPA 
provides government-funded abortion services for all women for any 
reason through the twelfth week of gestation.145  From the thirteenth 
week, up to and including the twentieth week of gestation, the 
CTOPA conditions abortion on a medical practitioner’s determina-
tion that: there is “a risk of injury to the woman’s physical or mental 
health;” there is a risk of severe fetal abnormality; “the pregnancy re-
sulted from rape or incest;” or “the continued pregnancy would sig-
nificantly affect the social and economic circumstances of the wom-
an.”146  After twenty weeks of gestation, and with the opinions of two 
medical practitioners, abortion is permissible if continued pregnancy 
“(i) would endanger the woman’s life; (ii) would result in a severe 
malformation of the fetus; or (iii) would pose a risk of injury to the 
fetus.”147  Roe v. Wade inspired the CTOPA’s trimester approach.148  
Drafters of the CTOPA believed a trimester approach would “ground 
                                                          
 142.  Christian Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Minister of Health 2004 (4) All SA 31(SCA) at 35–36, 
42–45 (S. Afr.). 
 143.  Id. at 46–47. 
 144.  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 pmbl. (S. Afr.) (“This Act 
therefore repeals the restrictive and inaccessible provisions of the Abortion and Steriliza-
tion Act, 1975.”).  Before passage of the CTOPA, the Abortion and Sterilization Act 2 of 
1975 governed abortion in South Africa.  That Act permitted abortion only when there was 
a serious threat to a woman’s physical or mental health, risk of serious disability of the fe-
tus, or a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest, and only upon the approval of two medi-
cal practitioners, excluding the practitioner who will perform the abortion.  Abortion and 
Sterilization Act 2 of 1975 §§ 2–3 (S. Afr.). 
 145.  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 pmbl., § 2 (“[r]ecognising 
that the State has the responsibility to provide reproductive health to all”), amended by 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 1 of 2008 pmbl. 
 146.  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 § 2(1)(b). 
 147.  Id. § 2(1)(c) (stating that the two medical opinions could come from a medical 
practitioner and a registered midwife). 
 148.  Julia L. Ernst et al., The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing Women’s Reproduc-
tive Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 761 
(2004). 
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[the law] ‘in the right to freedom, dignity and autonomy of the wom-
an,’”149 while also respecting the “‘changing moral attitudes of women 
towards developing fetal life.’”150 
In 2004, the Christian Lawyers Association, a South African non-
profit organization, challenged minors’ access to abortion without pa-
rental consent under the CTOPA.151  In rejecting the challenge, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal quoted at length from Roe and described 
Casey as “affirm[ing] the essential findings of Roe including the prin-
ciple that women have a constitutional right to determine the fate of 
their own pregnancy.”152  The court concluded, “[t]he same consider-
ations as applied in the [United States] would compel one to con-
clude that our Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose.”153 
Ultimately, the court did not apply those “same considerations” 
because the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides ex-
plicit protection for the right “to make decisions concerning repro-
duction”154 and the right to “have access to . . . health care services, in-
cluding reproductive health care.”155  A woman’s right to determine 
her fate, however, was not a sufficient reason to strike down require-
ments for parental involvement in the United States.  The Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s decision did not mention that Casey upheld Penn-
                                                          
 149.  Rachel Rebouché, The Limits of Reproductive Rights in Improving Women’s Health, 63 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 16 (2011) [hereinafter Rebouché, Reproductive Rights] (quoting a South Af-
rican activist in CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., THIRTY FACES OF ROE: INTERNATIONAL VOICES 
(2006)). 
 150.  Id. (quoting UN INT’L RES. AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
WOMEN, ENGENDERING THE POLITICAL AGENDA: THE ROLE OF THE STATE, WOMEN’S 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 204 (Tatjana Sikoska et al. eds., 
2000)). 
 151.  Christian Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Minister of Health 2004 (4) All SA 31 (SCA) at 40–42 
(S. Afr.). 
 152.  Id. at 42–45. 
 153.  Id. at 45.  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa compels domestic 
courts to “consider international law,” and states that the courts “may consider foreign 
law.”  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 39(1)(b)–(c), available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents 
/constitution/1996/index.htm. 
 154.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 12(2)(a); Christian Lawyers’ 2004 (4) All SA at 45. 
 155.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27(1)(a); Christian Lawyers’ 2004 (4) All SA at 45. 
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sylvania’s parental consent law, which required parental permission 
before a minor’s abortion.156 
The South African court described German case law as an excep-
tion to an international consensus that a fetus does not enjoy consti-
tutional rights to life at the expense of a woman’s rights to terminate 
her pregnancy.157  The court acknowledged that the state has an in-
terest in protecting fetal life, but noted that any regulation of abor-
tion could not deny women their constitutionally protected right to 
choose to have an abortion.158  In making this argument, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal framed Germany as an exception to approaches in 
England, the United States, and Canada.159 
Describing the German cases as “alternative perspective[s],” the 
Supreme Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he German Constitutional 
Court has held that the right to life extends to the protection of pre-
natal life[, but] also recognised a countervailing constitutional right 
which protects the woman’s personal autonomy.”160  The court stated: 
                                                          
 156.   See Christian Lawyers’ 2004 (4) All SA at 44–45 (discussing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Casey, but omitting any discussion of the parental consent provision); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 47–48, 51. 
 157.  Christian Lawyers’ 2004 (4) All SA at 46. 
 158.  See id. at 46–47 (“The state has a legitimate role, in the protection of pre-natal life 
as an important value in our society, to regulate and limit the woman’s right to choose in 
that regard[, but] the regulation thereof by the State may not amount to the denial of that 
right.”).  In a previous case, also brought by the Christian Lawyers’ Association, the High 
Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division dismissed a challenge to the CTOPA based on 
the right to life for the fetus.  The court quoted from Roe in support of the “generally ac-
cepted” principle among other countries that a fetus does not have a right to life because 
granting such a right would infringe on women’s rights to equality and security of person.  
Christian Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Minister of Health 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T) at 1124 (S. Afr.); see Klug, 
supra note 23, at 612 (observing that the Christian Lawyers’ challenge in the 1998 case 
“was dismissed on the grounds that the fetus is not a bearer of rights under the South Afri-
can Constitution”). 
 159.  Christian Lawyers’ 2004 (4) All SA at 42–47; see also Christian Lawyers 1998 (4) SA at 
1125 (“The exception to this line of authority in England, the United States of America, 
Canada and the European Court of Human Rights, is Germany.”).  In the 1998 decision, 
the High Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division, quoting U.S. law professor Gerald 
Neuman, opined that the 1975 FCC decision from Germany was a “‘reaction against the 
contempt for individual life displayed in the Nazi period as well as the Catholic natural law 
that provided one strand of the rights orientation in the 1949 Constitution.’”  Christian 
Lawyers 1998 (4) SA at 1125–26 (quoting Neuman, supra note 3, at 289–90). 
 160.  Christian Lawyers’ 2004 (4) All SA at 46. 
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 The jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court ac-
cordingly lends support to an alternative perspective that the 
right to freedom and security of the person affords constitu-
tional protection to a woman’s right to determine the fate of 
her own pregnancy, albeit subject to limitation to protect 
the life of the foetus.161 
The court did not specify whether it was referring to the 1975 or 
the 1993 FCC decision, or both.162  Rather, it treated the decisions as 
the same by suggesting that both cases protected fetal life subject to 
balancing women’s rights.163 
In short, the South African court’s use of comparative law placed 
the CTOPA at the forefront of liberalization, having recognized abor-
tion on request.164  The Supreme Court of Appeal positioned South 
Africa as a state in which constitutionalized women’s rights take prec-
edence.165  However, the court ignored key aspects of U.S. law, partic-
ularly the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey, which cut back on wom-
en’s rights to abortion by upholding consent laws and abandoning the 
Roe trimester framework.  In addition, the South African court did not 
acknowledge how the 1993 FCC decision revised the rights-balancing 
approach of the 1975 FCC decision by suspending prosecution for 
abortion that is accompanied by counseling.166 
C.  Identifying with Germany: Portugal 
Contrast the approach of South Africa, which identifies with a 
dated conception of U.S. constitutional law, with that of Portugal.  In 
                                                          
 161.  Id.  The court further cited Bruggemann v. Germany, a 1977 decision from the Eu-
ropean Commission of Human Rights, for the proposition that “although the woman has a 
right of self-determination, it [is] permissible for the State to regulate abortion because 
the right to privacy ‘cannot be interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and its termination 
are, as a principle, solely a matter of the private life of the mother’.” Id. (quoting Brug-
gemann v. Germany, No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244, 253, available at 
http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=2033). 
 162.  Id. (discussing “[t]he jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court,” but 
making no distinction between the 1975 and 1993 FCC decisions). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 35, 49. 
 165.  Id. at 48 (“Our Constitution protects the right of a woman to determine the fate of 
her own pregnancy.  It follows that the State may not unduly interfere with a woman’s 
right to choose whether or not to undergo an abortion.”). 
 166.  See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
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a 2010 decision,167 the Constitutional Court of Portugal upheld a law 
permitting early abortion for any reason when coupled with counsel-
ing.168  Although the court referred to women’s rights in its holding,169 
it also aligned with the German FCC, and against the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in ways that might cater to the attitudes of the Portuguese 
population.170 
In 2007, the Assembly of the Republic of Portugal passed legisla-
tion (“the 2007 Act”) that amended the Portuguese Penal Code to 
permit abortion until the tenth week of pregnancy (“and, when due 
to the fetus’ medical condition, up to 24 weeks”).171  Before the 2007 
Act, the law restricted abortion during the first twelve weeks of preg-
nancy to instances where there was risk to the woman’s life, physical, 
or mental health, or when the pregnancy resulted from a rape.  From 
twelve to sixteen weeks, abortion was permitted in cases of “serious 
disease or defect” of the fetus.172 
The 2007 Act required counseling and a three-day waiting peri-
od, and set out the provisions for counseling in some detail.173  For 
example, non-directive counseling was required to help women make 
                                                          
 167.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, Relator: Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, 23.02.2010, 60, 
DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA 2.ª SÉRIE [D.R.], 26.03.2010, 115566 (Port.) (translation provided by 
Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author). 
 168.  Id. at 15591. 
 169.  Id. at 15582 (holding that by continuing pregnancy, a woman is responsible for 
“permanent duties of support and care for another person, which is a burden over her ex-
istential sphere”). 
 170.  Id. at 15578, 15581–84. 
 171.  Lei No. 16/2007, de 10 de Abril de 2007, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 1.ª SÉRIE [D.R.], 
75: 2417 de 17.04.2007 (Port.) (translation provided by Marcelina Alvrim and on file with 
author); Debora Diniz, Constitutional Court of Portugal Upholds the Abortion Law (Lei n. 
16/2007)—Acórdão 75/2010, Reprod. and Sexual Health Law Listserve 1 (Oct. 20, 2010), 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/reprohealth/LS056_Portugal_abortion_law.pdf.  
The 2007 Act followed a national referendum that did not receive the necessary participa-
tion of 50% of the voting population: “54.43% of the voters were absent,” 59.25% voted for 
abortion law reform, and 40.75% voted against law reform.  Id.  A similar referendum 
failed to pass in 1998.  See id. (“In 1998, the Supreme Court [of Portugal] supported the 
constitutionality of a national referendum on the proposed reform . . . , in which 68.1% of 
the voters were absent. 50.9% said no to the law reform and 49.1% said yes to the law re-
form.”). 
 172.  See Glendon, supra note 1, at 149 (citing “Portuguese Law No. 6184 of 11 May 1984 
[as] translated in 35 I.D.H.L. 768 (1984)”). 
 173.  Lei No. 16/2007, D.R., 75: 2417 (Port.). 
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a “free decision, [that is] conscious and responsible.”174  The counsel-
ing sessions had to include information about the possible health 
risks of abortion, state support available to women who continue their 
pregnancies, and psychological and social assistance available to 
women during the waiting period.175  The 2007 Act also provided that 
medical practitioners could refuse to participate in abortion proce-
dures, but that an objecting practitioner could not be involved in the 
counseling session.176 
In 2010, thirty-three politicians and representatives of the Madei-
ra Archipelago, an autonomous region of Portugal, challenged the 
constitutionality of the 2007 Act.177  The petitioners argued that be-
cause Article 24 of the Portuguese Constitution provides that 
“[h]uman life shall be inviolable,” any counseling offered to pregnant 
women must try to deter them from abortion.178  To this end, the peti-
tioners argued that: non-directive counseling failed to meet the state’s 
duty to protect potential life or ensure women’s informed consent; a 
three-day reflection period was too short to dissuade women from 
abortion; and prohibiting abortion objectors from offering counsel-
ing was discrimination.179 
                                                          
 174.  Id.  Shortly after the 2007 Act was passed, the President’s office asked for addition-
al “safeguards,” including counseling about adoption options and the health consequenc-
es of abortion, as well as recommending that the father be allowed to attend counseling 
sessions.  Portugal Ratifies Law Allowing Abortions, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2007, 9:31 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/10/1. 
 175.  Lei No. 16/2007, D.R., 75: 2417 (Port.).  The 2007 Act did not require third-party 
consent or notice for women over the age of 16.  Id.  In addition, women who sought abor-
tions were entitled to confidentiality.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 2418. 
 177.  Diniz, supra note 171, at 1. 
 178.  CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] art. 24(1) [hereinaf-
ter Portuguese Constitution], translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC: 
SEVENTH REVISION [2005], http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_ 
leg/Constitution_VII_revisao_definitive.pdf; T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, Relator: Joaquim 
de Sousa Ribeiro, 23.02.2010, 60, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2.ª SÉRIE [D.R.], 26.03.2010, 
15566, 15570–71 (translation provided by Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author). 
 179.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, 60, D.R., 15575 (Port.); Diniz, supra note 171, at 1–2.  
The petitioners also argued that the exclusion of a father’s consent to an abortion offend-
ed “the right to found a family and to marry on terms of full equality” for men under the 
Portuguese Constitution.  PORTUGUESE CONSTITUTION art. 36(1), CONSTITUTION OF THE 
PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC: SEVENTH REVISION [2005], supra note 178; T.C., Acórdão No. 
75/2010, 60, D.R., 15575. 
  
116 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:85 
The Constitutional Court of Portugal dismissed all of the peti-
tioners’ claims.180  As for the waiting period, the court held that: 
(1) [three days] is only a minimum period of time; (2) there 
is a limit of ten weeks to performance the abortion, so any 
extension of this period might have consequences for wom-
en’s rights; (3) there is no evidence that lengthening this 
period of time would cause the woman to decide different-
ly.181 
The court also stated that “a health care meeting between the woman 
and the provider [is] not a moral arena to debate different perspec-
tives about abortion,” concluding that neutral counseling and exclu-
sion of the refusing practitioner were constitutional.182 
Responding to the crux of petitioners’ claims, the Court held 
that counseling need not be dissuasive.  To that end, the court cited 
U.S. and German jurisprudence and briefly described the counseling 
requirements of several other countries.183  The court noted that the 
dominant global model was liberalization, but that there were differ-
ent approaches to punishing or restricting women’s abortion deci-
sions and different means by which to provide counseling options.184  
The court was quick to contrast Portugal’s law with what it perceived 
to be the U.S. standard, in which women may make “spontaneous de-
cisions.”185  The court reasoned that U.S. women make their abortion 
decisions alone, while Portuguese women have the support of the 
state in considering whether to choose abortion or childbirth.186 
                                                          
 180.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, 60, D.R., 15596 (Port.).  Much of the decision is de-
voted to why regions in Portugal could not opt out of implementing the 2007 Act.  Id. at 
15592–96. 
 181.  Diniz, supra note 171, at 2. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, 60, D.R., 15582–84 (Port.).  The Portuguese Constitu-
tion provides that “[t]he rules and principles of general or common international law shall 
form an integral part of Portuguese law.”  PORTUGUESE CONSTITUTION art. 8, 
CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC: SEVENTH REVISION [2005], supra note 178. 
 184.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, 60, D.R., 15582–83 (Port.). 
 185.  Id. at 15578.  As the next Part considers, numerous U.S. laws condition abortion 
on counseling and waiting periods.  See infra Part III.A. 
 186.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, 60, D.R., 15580 (Port.).  The court also cited a dis-
senting opinion from the 1993 FCC decision to support an argument in favor of affording 
discretion to the legislature to protect fetal life as pregnancy develops. Id. 15579, 15581–
82.  This rejection of the U.S. approach built on the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in 
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The Constitutional Court described U.S. abortion law as the 
height of liberalization, in which abortion is an entirely private deci-
sion, made at any time.187  But post-Roe legislative developments in the 
United States, especially in the area of informed consent, suggest that 
this is a questionable assumption.  Rather than being alone in their 
decisions, U.S. women encounter a dense network of laws that make 
an abortion anything but “spontaneous.”188 
After distancing Portugal’s law from that of the United States, the 
Constitutional Court cited the 1993 FCC decision as an example of a 
counseling regime that relied on preventive, rather than punitive, 
measures and social services to deter abortion.189  The court reasoned 
that the counseling requirements in Portugal—informing women of 
risks, obtaining written consent, and providing information on con-
traception and support services—accomplished the goals set out by 
the 1993 FCC decision but without the explicit acknowledgement of a 
constitutional right to life for a fetus.190  The court framed Germany’s 
case law as, on the one hand, an outlier in comparison to that of its 
European neighbors, but, on the other, not so different in its use of 
measures to promote childbirth and dissuade women from abor-
tion.191  Even though the Constitutional Court of Portugal noted that 
German counseling promotes life, it made the case that Portugal’s 
non-directive counseling was implicitly dissuasive.192  The court con-
cluded that the legislature could pursue the counseling regime it be-
lieved most likely to change women’s minds, which translated into 
state support for pregnancy and childbirth.193   
In a sense, the Portuguese legislation, with its non-directive coun-
seling and emphasis on state services, looks like the German legisla-
tion that the FCC struck down in 1993 on the grounds that the legisla-
tion failed to comply with the Basic Law’s protection of unborn life.  
                                                          
two previous cases in which the court upheld the constitutionality of national referendums 
on abortion.  T.C., Acórdão No. 617/2006, Relator: Maria Fernanda Palma, 15.11.2006, 
223, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 1.ª SÉRIE [D.R.], 20.11.2006, 7970-(2), 7970-(13) to-(14) 
(Port.); T.C., Acórdão No. 288/98, Relator: Luís Nunes de Almeida Brito, 17.04.1998, 91, 
DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 1.ª SÉRIE [D.R.], 18.04.1998, 1714-(2), 1714-(23) (Port.). 
 187.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, 60, D.R., 15578, 15580 (Port.). 
 188.  See infra Part III.A. 
 189.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, 60, D.R., 15581–83 (Port.). 
 190.  Id. at 15583–84. 
 191.  Id. at 15581–85. 
 192.  Id. at 15584. 
 193.  Id. 
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Although the 1993 FCC decision granted the legislature discretion to 
use means other than criminalization to deter abortion, such as coun-
seling, it did not recognize a pregnant woman’s right to abortion.  Ra-
ther, the FCC stated that legislation must convey the message that 
abortion is always a moral wrong.194  In upholding the non-directive 
counseling system, the Constitutional Court of Portugal minimized 
this central premise of the 1993 FCC decision.  The court invoked 
German law to distinguish Portugal from countries with “abortion on 
demand,” even though Portugal’s legislation allowed women to obtain 
abortions for any reason and with non-directive counseling.195 
In dissent, Justice Maria Lucia Amaral contested the majority’s 
decision to distance itself from the U.S. Supreme Court and to associ-
ate with Germany’s counseling requirements.  Similar to the majority 
opinion, Justice Amaral’s dissent asserted that U.S. law conditioned 
the availability of abortion only on a pregnant woman’s will to seek 
one.196  She argued that in upholding abortion on request until the 
tenth week, the majority issued a judgment that looked like Roe.197  In 
her view, the majority chose between extremes: a state duty to protect 
“unborn life” and the rejection of that duty, which she argued was 
signified by Roe.198  Justice Amaral’s contention was not that the major-
ity’s recitation of comparative law was inaccurate.  Rather, Justice Am-
aral argued that the majority contorted national Portuguese values in 
the service of a borrowed, foreign approach.199 
D.  Repackaged Comparisons: Mexico City 
What the Colombian, South African, and Portuguese decisions 
reveal is that courts conceive of the options for abortion law reform in 
longstanding and limited ways, as choices between liberal and crimi-
nal regimes, represented by the United States and Germany, respec-
tively, or as staking out a middle ground that balances women’s rights 
                                                          
 194.  See supra notes 92–98.  In the 1993 FCC decision, the court suggested that this 
could be done through strictly regulated, mandatory, dissuasive counseling as well as 
through the limitation of public funds to only those abortions considered legal (that is, 
backed by a tolerated exception) or for poor women.  See supra notes 92–101 and accom-
panying text. 
 195.  T.C., Acórdão No. 75/2010, 60, D.R., 15582–83 (Port.). 
 196.  Id. at 15601 (Amaral, J. dissenting). 
 197.  Id. at 15600–01. 
 198.  Id. at 15601. 
 199.  Id. at 15600–01. 
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and fetal rights.  It bears repeating that the mainstays of comparison, 
Roe and the 1975 FCC decision, are almost forty years old.200  Yet, simi-
lar to the decisions already discussed, a 2007 decision from the Su-
preme Court of Mexico upholding Mexico City’s decriminalization of 
early abortion201 collapses the trajectory of abortion law in the United 
States and Germany from the 1970s to the 1990s.  Introducing a new 
theme, the Mexican decision also repackages contemporary examples 
from Colombia and South Africa as expressing meanings similar to 
those of the traditional comparators.202 
In 2007, the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City redefined the 
crime of abortion as the interruption of pregnancy after the twelfth 
week of gestation and established that, prior to that point, termina-
tion of a pregnancy for any reason was a free health service available 
in public hospitals, regardless of the patient’s financial need.203  Un-
                                                          
 200.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7, at 
605–84. 
 201.  Acción De Inconstitucionalidad, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] 
[Supreme Court], Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, Página 176, 205–06  (Mex.), available at 
http://www.equidad.scjn.gob.mx/IMG/pdf/ENGROSECOSSxcdO-146-07.pdf (translation 
provided by Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author). 
 202.  Id. Página 790–91.  There is a rich literature discussing how comparative constitu-
tional law travels or migrates.  See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Com-
parative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry 
ed., 2006) (noting that the migration metaphor as applied to comparative constitutional 
law “grants equal prominence to the fact of movement of constitutional ideas across legal 
orders, as well as to the actual ideas which are migrating”); VICKI C. JACKSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 42 (2010) (“Convergence, 
though, may also be a normative interpretive posture, working to conform national consti-
tutional interpretation to international law or transnational legal consensus.”).  For a 
summary of this literature, see Vlad Perju, Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, and Migra-
tions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304 (Michel Rosen-
feld & András Sajo eds., 2012) (observing that “instances of constitutional borrowing are 
now everywhere [with c]ourts around the world . . . often consult[ing] the work of their 
foreign peers in interpreting similarly worded constitutional provisions”). 
 203.  Public Administration of Mexico City, Mayor’s Office Decrees the Reform of the Mexico 
City Penal Code and Additions to the Mexico City Health Law, 70 OFFICIAL MEXICO CITY 
GAZETTE, Penal Code art. 144, Health Code art. 16, § 6, (26 April 2007) [hereinafter 
Mayor’s Office Decrees], available at http://www.gire.org.mx/publica2/MexicoCityLaw_ 
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der the 2007 reforms, health professionals are required to give wom-
en timely and truthful information about abortion alternatives and 
possible side effects of abortion, distribute free contraception, and of-
fer counseling after the procedure.204 
The Supreme Court of Mexico upheld the Mexico City law 
against a challenge to its constitutionality.205  The court held that the 
Constitution of Mexico did not recognize a right to life, but did pro-
tect women’s rights.206  A concurring opinion cited Roe v. Wade as an 
example of an approach that values women’s rights to privacy and au-
tonomy.207  In Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the state 
could intervene early in pregnancy and that any regulation post-
viability must preserve women’s health, but could also serve to protect 
fetal life.208  According to the majority of the Supreme Court of Mexi-
co, Roe, as reaffirmed by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, is the backbone of this understanding with its emphasis on 
viability.209  Like the decisions previously described in this Part, the 
Mexican court’s decision minimized the differences between the tri-
mester test announced in Roe and the undue burden standard an-
nounced in Casey.210 
                                                          
English.pdf.  Abortion for any reason after the twelfth week remains a punishable offense.  
Id.; Penal Code art. 145.  Also, the Health Code states that the procedure must be per-
formed within five days of the woman’s request.  Luisa Conesa Labastida, Making the Best of 
It: A Conceptual Reconstruction of Abortion Jurisprudence in the United States and Mexico, 2 MEX. 
L. REV. 31, 59 (2010); see Alejandro Madrazo & Estefanía Vela, The Mexican Supreme Court’s 
(Sexual) Revolution?, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1874–75 (2011) (describing the 2007 reforms to 
Mexico City’s criminal code and health law). 
 204.  Mayor’s Office Decrees, supra note 203, Health Code art. 16, § 8; Labastida, supra note 
203, at 59. 
 205.  SCJN, Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, Página 205–06. 
 206.  Id. at 174–75.  In considering Mexico’s obligations under international law, the 
court noted that there was no international convention to which Mexico was a party that 
established when life begins.  Id. at 173–74; Labastida, supra note 203, at 61. 
 207.  SCJN, Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, Página 246 & n.121 (Mex.) (Pimentel, J., con-
curring) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965)). 
 208.  See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 209.  SCJN, Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, Página 790 (Mex.) (majority opinion). 
 210.  Id.  In her dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority’s 
decision to uphold the ban on a procedure that was sometimes performed before viability.  
550 U.S. 124, 170–71 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra Part I.A. 
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The Supreme Court of Mexico referred to German case law for 
the opposite argument.  The court stated that the FCC protected the 
“life of the unborn as an independent legal interest, establishing as a 
duty of the woman to take the pregnancy to term until the moment of 
labor and a governmental obligation to implement the legal mecha-
nisms for the protection of the life of the fetus.”211  In short, under the 
Supreme Court’s view of German law, the interests of potential life 
outweighed women’s rights in the absence of undue hardship for 
women.212  However, the court did not make clear to which of the two 
FCC decisions it was referring.  Indeed, much as it did with Roe and 
Casey, the court treated both the 1975 and 1993 FCC decisions as in-
terchangeable.213 
In addition to U.S. and German law, the court cited the Colom-
bian and South African cases discussed above to make points for 
which U.S. and German cases are typically used.214  Three dissenting 
justices, quoting a Constitutional Court case from Colombia, argued 
that Colombian law aligned with German jurisprudence, “‘to estab-
lish, in defense of the life that begins with conception, an effective le-
gal protection system, including necessarily adoption of criminal 
laws.’”215  Interestingly, the Colombian court did not only align its ap-
proach with the 1975 FCC decision; that court also drew from the ap-
proach of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe.216 
In comparison, the majority of the Supreme Court of Mexico 
noted that South Africa protected a woman’s right to abortion at any 
age and refused to grant rights to potential life before birth.217  The 
                                                          
 211.  SCJN, Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, Página 739 (Mex.). 
 212.  Id. at 791–92. 
 213.  The court only incidentally mentioned grounds of undue hardship for medical 
reasons and did not mention the earlier category of “social need.”  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 791.  The court also briefly cited abortion cases from Canada, R. v. Morgental-
er, [1988] S.C.R. 30, and Spain, T.C., Apr. 11, 1985 (B.J.C. No. 1985–49, p. 515), and re-
ferred to the abortion laws of Italy and France as well.  SCJN, Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, 
Página 738–39, 791, 795–96; see also supra notes 2, 122 and accompanying text. 
 215.  SCJN, Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, Página 525–28 (Mex.) (Anguiano, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Plena marzo 17, 1994, 
Sentencia C-133/1994 (Colom.)). 
 216.  See supra Part II.A. 
 217.  SCJN, Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, Página 791–93 (Mex.) (majority opinion).  The 
opinion also noted a handful of countries, Colombia included, that would not, as a legal 
matter, determine the complex, controversial question of when human life begins—an 
inquiry better suited to medicine or philosophy.  Id. at 789–92. 
  
122 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:85 
Mexican court is not alone in invoking the South African decision as a 
point of comparison.  In 2009, the Supreme Court of Nepal cited the 
South African case, alongside Roe, for the argument that a fetus can-
not be recognized as a person.218  The Supreme Court of Nepal’s deci-
sion cited extensively to international and comparative law, using re-
productive rights interchangeably with the meanings associated with 
U.S. and South African case law.219 
The Mexican and Nepalese decisions draw on a broader range of 
examples, but they return to the same principle comparators, with 
U.S. and German examples ultimately defining the scope of reform 
opportunities.  In general, the decisions discussed in this Part employ 
a comparative method that places country experiences, as embodied 
in judicial opinions and statutes, along a spectrum of legality.  At one 
end is abortion as a criminal act that protects fetal life (responsive to 
local or national concerns),220 and at the other is abortion as a non-
criminal act that protects women’s rights (responsive to global and 
progressive concerns).221  Although the United States and Germany 
                                                          
 218.  See Lakshmi Dhikta v. Nepal, (2009) WO-0757, 2067, excerpts translated at LAKSHMI 
DHIKTA CASE SUMMARY AND TRANSLATED EXCERPTS 2, http://reproductiverights.org/sites 
/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Lakshmi%20Dhikta%20-
%20English%20translation.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (citing Roe for the proposition 
that the U.S. Supreme Court did not recognize the fetus as a human life and citing South 
African jurisprudence and a 1974 decision by the Supreme Court of Austria for the argu-
ment that a fetus cannot be recognized as a person); see also CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS: 
FORUM FOR WOMEN, LAW, AND DEV., LAKSHMI DHIKTA V. NEPAL 2, available at 
http://www.asap-asia.org/LD_FS_4.11.pdf (summarizing the Dhikta case). 
 219.  LAKSHMI DHIKTA CASE SUMMARY AND TRANSLATED EXCERPTS, supra note 218, at 2, 
5, 8; LAKSHMI DHIKTA V. NEPAL, supra note 218, at 2. 
 220.  See supra Part II.C. 
 221.  See supra Part II.B.  Similarly, Werner and Kommers argue that U.S. law resonates 
with commitments to women’s rights (sometimes at the expense of other state interests) 
and the German approach with communitarian values that curtail women’s rights (but 
recognize limited individual rights).  See Kommers, supra note 19, at 28 (“In Germany, the 
main contestants did not question the state’s duty to protect the life of the fetus at all stag-
es of pregnancy.  On this question, the most non-religious Social Democrat could agree 
with the most religious Christian Democrat.”); see also Werner, supra note 78, at 599–601 
(comparing U.S. and German abortion jurisprudence and noting that “in the United 
States, the woman has the privilege to be free from undue burdens by the state in her right 
to decide about abortion[, but] in Germany, because the core of the German concept of 
prevention by counseling is to make the woman an ally in protecting the unborn life, it 
emphasizes an informed but unhindered decision”). 
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treat the legality of abortion differently, under this dominant com-
parative framework, they overlap in recognizing basic grounds for le-
gal abortion.  As Part IV suggests, this mirrors what scholars and advo-
cates argue is the consensus for legal abortion as a subject of 
international human rights law. 
Part III argues that the ends of this spectrum (the respective ap-
proaches of the United States and Germany) present a more compli-
cated story than national courts acknowledge.  The realities of abor-
tion provision in the United States and Germany show that reducing 
countries to their landmark court decisions may not support these na-
tional courts’ ultimate purpose of citing comparative law—that coun-
tries with strong rights to abortion provide extensive legal abortion 
services. 
III.  THE INVERTED AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES 
National courts’ comparative method ignores the current state of 
U.S. and German law.  In particular, despite the rhetoric of Roe and, 
to a lesser extent, Casey, U.S. law imposes substantial legal barriers on 
women seeking abortions.222  German law, by contrast, makes it possi-
ble for women to navigate legal restrictions with relative ease.223  For 
example, in the United States, abortion is not readily available for 
many women without financial means, whereas Germany heavily sub-
sidizes abortion services.  This Part compares the availability of abor-
tion in the United States with the availability in Germany.  It demon-
strates that legal restrictions and financial limitations call into 
question the persistent borrowing from U.S. and German jurispru-
dence, and displace the assumptions underpinning the dominant 
comparative method, which relies upon the binary choices between 
U.S. liberalization and German criminalization. 
A.  Abortion Availability in the United States 
The national court decisions discussed in Part II largely ignore 
post-Roe developments when they describe an emerging, global con-
sensus on abortion.  Perhaps this is unsurprising, given that courts in-
voke Roe to illustrate a women’s-rights approach to abortion.224  But 
                                                          
 222.  See infra Part III.A. 
 223.  See infra Part III.B. 
 224.  See, e.g., Christian Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Minister of Health 2004 (4) All SA 31 (SCA) 
at 44 (S. Afr.) (noting that in Casey, “the [U.S.] Supreme Court again affirmed the essen-
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perpetuating this image of the United States may distort the signifi-
cance of more recent laws (or the cases upholding them) that explic-
itly seek to protect fetal rights.  This Section shows that the right to 
abortion is difficult to realize for many U.S. women, challenging the 
invocation of Roe as the hallmark of a liberal regime protective of 
women’s rights. 
State laws in the United States regulating abortion take a variety 
of forms, including requirements and regulations for special licenses, 
admitting privileges at hospitals, ethics training, clinic or facility space 
and design, ambulatory surgical centers, and detailed record-
keeping.225  All of these restrictions apply throughout pregnancy.226  
Almost ninety percent of American women who seek an abortion do 
so in the first trimester of pregnancy, and many women who end 
pregnancies in the second or third trimesters do so because of fetal 
anomaly, a legal ground for abortion in Germany.227  So, although 
                                                          
tial findings of Roe including the principle that women have a constitutional right to de-
termine the fate of their own pregnancy”). 
 225.  For example, “[forty-six states] require hospitals, facilities, and physicians provid-
ing abortions to submit regular and confidential reports to the state” and fourteen states 
further require certification that “mandates for abortion counseling and parental involve-
ment were satisfied.”  GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: ABORTION REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS 1 (Sept. 1, 2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs 
/spib_ARR.pdf.  In April 2011, the Kansas State Legislature passed an act that “created a 
new licensing category for abortion providers.”  Kate Sheppard, Abortion Foes’ Latest Back-
door Ban, MOTHER JONES (June 27, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/politics 
/2011/06/abortion-foes-latest-backdoor-ban. 
Regulations issued pursuant to the act require expanded waiting room and janitorial 
supply spaces.  Id.  Further, doctors must now have admitting privileges “to directly admit 
patients[] at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic.”  Id.  Similar laws have been passed in 
Virginia and Utah.  Id. 
 226.  Cf. STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: ABORTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, supra note 
225, at 1 (noting that “most state vital statistics agencies have adopted” an abortion report-
ing form that requires, among other disclosures, “gestational age”). 
 227.  Only twelve percent of abortions are performed in the second trimester, but 
“women seeking second trimester abortions are medically ‘a very important group, includ-
ing virtually all patients who have antenatal diagnosis of congenital anomalies.’”  Maya 
Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent & Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 228 (2009).  Only 1.5% of women have abortions in the third tri-
mester.  GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Aug. 
2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf; see also su-
pra Part I.B.; infra Part III.B. 
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abortion with counseling is not available in Germany after the twelfth 
week of pregnancy, because Germany allows legal terminations for 
reason of fetal abnormality, most American women who seek second-
trimester abortions could also do so in Germany.   
After viability, forty-one states strictly limit or ban women’s access 
to abortion.228  The most recent restrictions on the availability of ser-
vices are new state laws that prohibit providers from performing abor-
tions after twenty weeks of gestation, which is, in most cases, before 
viability.229  These laws appear to contradict Casey, in which the plurali-
ty determined that states could not ban abortion before viability 
(about twenty-three to twenty-four weeks of pregnancy).230  As of June 
2011, six states had passed legislation banning abortion after twenty 
weeks unless the pregnant woman’s life is in danger or there is serious 
risk to physical health.231  The purpose of the bans is to protect fetal 
health, not women’s health.232  The premise of these laws is the con-
tested belief that fetuses can feel pain after twenty weeks.233 
                                                          
 228.  GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE POLICIES ON LATER 
ABORTIONS 1 (Sept. 1, 2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/ 
spib_PLTA.pdf.  Twenty-one of the forty-one states prohibit abortions after viability, five 
states ban abortion in the third trimester, and fifteen states do so “after a certain number 
of weeks, generally 24.”  Id. 
 229.  See infra note 231 and accompanying text.  As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the federal “partial birth abor-
tion” ban, “blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability abor-
tions.”  550 U.S. 124, 171 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 230.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (“[A] State 
may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her preg-
nancy before viability.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (“Viability is usually 
placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”). 
 231.  Erik Eckholm, Several States Forbid Abortion After 20 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, 
at A10 (listing Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma).  As of Sep-
tember 2012, Louisiana and North Carolina had also banned abortion after twenty weeks.  
STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE POLICIES ON LATER ABORTIONS, supra note 228, at 2.  The 
exception to the Nebraska prohibition is “a condition which . . . so complicates the medi-
cal condition of the pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her 
pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create a serious risk of substantial 
and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function.”  Legis. B. 1103, 101st 
Leg. 2d Sess. § 2(4) (Neb. 2010). 
 232.  See Eckholm, supra note 231 (“The purpose of this type of bill [banning abortion 
after the twentieth week] is to focus on the humanity of the unborn child . . . .”); see also 
Hearing on Legis. B. 847, Legis. B. 1043, Legis. B. 1089, and Legis. B. 1103 Before the Ju-
  
126 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:85 
In addition, several types of laws fall into what can loosely be la-
beled as informed-consent provisions.  Unlike with most medical pro-
cedures,234 the majority of states require abortion patients to observe 
waiting periods235 and require providers to deliver scripted counseling 
and information.236  Mandatory counseling may include information 
about abortion procedures generally or may require specific elabora-
tion of the procedure and its risks.237  It is common for states to re-
quire abortion providers to dispense information about possible phys-
ical or psychological consequences of abortion and about the age or 
development of the fetus.238  Several states, however, mandate that 
                                                          
diciary Comm., 101st Leg., 2d Sess. 51 (Neb. 2010) (statement of Senator Brenda Council, 
Member, Judiciary Comm.) (noting that Legis. B. 1103 places the health of the fetus above 
that of the mother when the mother’s mental condition could lead to death or physical 
harm). 
 233.  See, e.g., Neb. Legis. B. 1103, § 3 (finding “substantial evidence that an unborn 
child” can feel pain after twenty weeks).  But see I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal 
Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 238–39 (2011) (re-
futing the Nebraska legislature’s finding that fetuses can “experience” pain at twenty 
weeks). 
 234.  See Scott Woodcock, Abortion Counseling and the Informed Consent Dilemma, 25 
BIOETHICS 495, 498, 500 (2011) (noting the divergence between informed consent for 
abortion and for other medical procedures, particularly regarding the “emotional harm” 
that can result from the “key move in the anti-abortionist argument to offer women any 
and all information related to abortion”). 
 235.  Twenty-six states require a waiting period between counseling and the abortion 
procedure.  GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING 
PERIODS FOR ABORTION 1 (Sept. 1, 2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/state 
center/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf.  Most waiting periods are twenty-four hours, but some 
states either impose longer time periods or require in-person counseling, necessitating two 
trips to the provider.  Id.  South Dakota is the outlier, recently having imposed a seventy-
two hour waiting period that is now the subject of litigation.  Id. at 2; see H.B. 1217, 2011 
Legis. Assemb. 86th Sess., § 3 (S.D. 2011) (imposing seventy-two hour waiting period); 
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1077 (D.S.D. 
2011) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the seventy-two hour 
waiting period). 
 236.  Thirty-five states require counseling before an abortion.  STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: 
COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION, supra note 235, at 1. 
 237.  Id. at 2–3. 
 238.  Id. at 1 (noting that thirty-three states require provision of information about ges-
tational age, while twenty-five states require information about fetal development).  But see 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (noting that informed 
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women receive counseling information that details only the possible 
negative risks239 such as infertility,240 and psychological problems like 
depression, anxiety, eating disorders, and suicidal tendencies.241  A 
handful of laws inaccurately link abortion to the occurrence of breast 
cancer or include information about the potential occurrence of fetal 
pain.242  Many states have also recently adopted controversial ultra-
sound requirements.243  Of particular interest are laws in Louisiana, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas that require physicians to dis-
play sonogram images even if patients have requested not to view the 
images.244  The Texas statute, for example, requires physicians to dis-
play and describe sonogram images to women, as well as play the 
sound of the fetal heartbeat.245 
                                                          
consent statutes that require providing information about the procedure, risks of abortion 
and childbirth, and “probable gestational age” of the unborn child are constitutional). 
 239.  STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION, supra 
note 235, at 1–3. 
 240.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(c)(1)(f) (West 2010) (requiring that the phy-
sician who performs the abortion inform the women about the risk of infertility). 
 241.  See, e.g., W. VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. RESOURCES, INFORMATION ON FETAL 
DEVELOPMENT, ABORTION & ADOPTION 15 (2003), available at http://www.wvdhhr.org/ 
wrtk/wrtkbooklet.pdf (listing “possible detrimental psychological effects of abortion,” 
which include depression, fear, anxiety, suicidal thoughts, and eating disorders). 
 242.  STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS, supra note 235, at 1 
(reporting that eleven state laws “include information on the ability of a fetus to feel pain,” 
and five states include inaccurate information on breast cancer). 
 243.  GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND 1 
(Sept. 1, 2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf. 
 244.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.2 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21-
8(1)(e) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).  The North 
Carolina and Oklahoma laws are “temporarily unenforceable pending a court decision.”  
STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND, supra note 243, at 2. 
 245.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(B)–(D).  In August 2011, a 
federal district court granted a preliminary injunction, ruling that the law offended physi-
cians’ First Amendment rights.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 
806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 975 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 
2012).  In January 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit lifted the injunc-
tion, holding that the district court erred in ruling that the physician-plaintiffs were likely 
to succeed on their challenge to the law’s constitutionality.  Tex. Med. Providers Perform-
ing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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And there are other varieties of abortion restrictions across the 
United States that this Section does not describe.  For example, fed-
eral law and the laws of forty-six states permit individual health care 
providers and institutions to refuse to participate in an abortion pro-
cedure through “conscience clauses.”246  Thirty-seven states require 
parental notice or consent before a minor’s abortion.247 
Perhaps the most salient abortion restrictions relate to funding, 
which significantly limit the availability of abortion in the United 
States as compared to Germany.  Each year a rider to the congres-
sional health appropriations bill (known as the “Hyde Amendment”) 
prohibits federal money from funding abortions for low-income 
women, except when the woman’s life is at stake or when pregnancy is 
the result of rape or incest.248  Although some states allow Medicaid 
funding for abortion, most states either follow the approach of the 
Hyde Amendment or ban state funding for any abortion services or 
referrals.249  In addition, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (“PPACA”) of 2010 excludes abortion as an essential benefit in 
the minimum set of services that new state exchange plans will cov-
er.250  This means that private insurance plans that elect to participate 
                                                          
 246.  While “[forty-four] states allow health care institutions to refuse to provide abor-
tion services[, thirteen states] limit the exemption to private health care institutions and 
[one] state allows only religious health care entities to refuse.”  GUTTMACHER INST., STATE 
POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES 2 (Sept. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/spib_RPHS.pdf.  The first federal conscience clause 
law, the “Church Amendment,” was enacted in 1973.  Health Programs Extension Act of 
1973, Pub. L. No. 93–45, 87 Stat. 95 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2006)). 
 247.  See Rachel Rebouché, Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance, 34 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 175, 179–88 (2011) (summarizing types of parental consent and notice laws). 
 248.  See NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, PUBLIC FUNDING FOR ABORTION: MEDICAID AND THE 
HYDE AMENDMENT 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/publ
ic_funding.pdf (noting that, in 1979, Congress removed the physical health exception, 
and, in 1981, the rape and incest exceptions, which were reintroduced in 1993). 
 249.  NAT’L NETWORK OF ABORTION FUNDS, ABORTION FUNDING: A MATTER OF JUSTICE 
4–5 (2005), available at http://www.fundabortionnow.org/sites/default/files/national_ 
network_of_abortion_funds_-_abortion_funding_a_matter_of_justice.pdf (noting that in 
2005, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia did not permit state Medicaid or oth-
er funds to cover low-income women’s abortion services, except in cases of rape). 
 250.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 
§ 1303(a)(1)(A)(i), 124 Stat. 119, 168 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 
29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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in state exchanges and to offer abortion coverage must comply with 
segregation rules to ensure that no federal money subsidizes abortion 
care.251  Since the passage of the PPACA, fifteen states have passed 
laws banning abortion coverage outright or prohibiting insurance 
companies that participate in state exchanges from offering any cov-
erage for abortion services; another fifteen states have proposed simi-
lar laws.252  The combination of new administrative and financial dis-
incentives for insurance companies to offer coverage253 and the 
PPACA’s potential expansion of Medicaid eligibility with Hyde 
Amendment restrictions will further entrench the status quo of wom-
en paying out of pocket for abortion services.254 
Finally, it is worth noting that, as a general matter, availability of 
abortion depends on the region in which a woman resides or her abil-
ity to travel to states with less restrictive laws.  Outside of the North-
east, the number of abortions performed in the Midwest, South, and 
West decreased by roughly ten percent from 2000 to 2005.255  A large 
                                                          
 251.  Cf. id. § 1303(a)(1)(B)(i), 124 Stat. at 169 (“The services described in this clause 
are abortions for which the expenditure of Federal funds appropriated for the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services is not permitted . . . .”). 
 252.  Karmah Elmusa, Map of the Day: States Banning Abortion Coverage, MOTHER JONES 
(June 29, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/06/map-state-abortion-
coverage-ban.  The U.S. House of Representatives passed the No Taxpayer Funding for 
Abortion Act of 2011, which was not voted on in the Senate.  H.R. 3, 112th Cong. (2011).  
The bill prevents employers from taking a tax deduction for insurance plans that include 
abortion coverage and prevents individuals from paying for plans that cover abortion with 
pretax dollars or flexible health spending accounts and from claiming a medical care de-
duction from federal taxes.  Id. §§ 201, 202, 204.  The Protect Life Act of 2011, which also 
passed in the House, amends the PPACA to prohibit health plans receiving federal funds 
to cover abortion.  H.R. 358, 112th Cong., § 2(c) (2011). 
 253.  See Susan A. Cohen, Insurance Coverage of Abortion: The Battle to Date and the Battle to 
Come, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Fall 2010, at 4, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
pubs/gpr/13/4/gpr130402.pdf (discussing the new administrative burden on insurers 
that will provide abortion coverage). 
 254.  The average cost of a first-trimester termination is approximately $468, increasing 
to over $1,000 as pregnancy progresses.  ABORTION FUNDING: A MATTER OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 249, at 6. 
 255.  Rachel Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 
40 PERSPS. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 10 (2008) (reporting that the number of abor-
tions decreased by 3% in the Northeast, 12% in the Midwest, 9% in the South, and 12% in 
the West).  Since 1980, there has been steady decline in abortion rates.  Id. at 9.  From 
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number of counties in the United States have no abortion provider: in 
2008, 87% of U.S. counties had no abortion provider and 97% of all 
non-metropolitan counties lacked abortion providers.256  Generally, 
between the years 1982 and 2000, the number of abortion providers 
in the United States declined from approximately 2,900 to 1,800.257  
Many obstetricians who are willing to provide abortion services cannot 
do so because of the costs of complying with state regulations, the lack 
of training opportunities in residencies, and fears of personal securi-
ty.258 
These restrictions on abortion availability in the United States 
paint a different picture than the national court decisions described 
in Part II.  Judges need not be historians or sociologists who have de-
tailed understandings of how foreign laws work in practice, although 
many restrictions are well documented in mainstream media,259 and 
the U.S. Supreme Court has decided several cases upholding some of 
these restrictions.260  But regardless of what courts should or can know 
about developments in foreign law, the gap between the decisions 
discussed in Part II and the facts on the ground is wide.  Courts re-
peatedly position the United States as the world’s liberal abortion re-
gime, which is in direct contradiction to the well-documented realities 
of abortion law and access in the country.261  
                                                          
1990 to 2005, the abortion rate dropped 25%.  Nancy Gibbs, Why Have Abortion Rates Fall-
en?, TIME, Jan. 21, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599, 
1705604,00.html.  “Each year, about two percent of women aged 15–44 have an abortion.”  
FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 227, at 1. 
 256.  Rachel Jones & Kathryn Kooistra, Abortion Incidence and Access to Services in the Unit-
ed States, 2008, 43 PERSPS. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 41, 46 (2011). 
 257.  Jones et al., supra note 255, at 6.  The number of abortion providers appears to 
have remained the same from 2005 to 2008.  Jones & Kooistra, supra note 256, at 46. 
 258.  LORI FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE: DOCTORS’ CONSTRAINTS IN ABORTION 
CARE  3–4 (2010). 
 259.  See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 25 (documenting abortion restrictions for the New 
York Times); Eckholm, supra note 231 (same). 
 260.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132, 168 (2007) (upholding federal ban 
on “partial birth” abortion); see also supra note 60. 
 261.  See Daniel Grossman et al., Self-Induction of Abortion Among Women in the United 
States, 18 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 136, 136–37, 140–42 (2010) (summarizing the barri-
ers to abortion in the United States, which may lead some women to self-induce abortion). 
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B.  Access to Abortion in Germany 
National courts likewise tell a partial story when their opinions 
suggest that the German experience is the antithesis of a liberal or 
modern abortion law.  The 1993 FCC decision and resulting legisla-
tive changes in 1995 have not created significant barriers to abortion 
services.  In fact, in Germany, the provision of abortion has “prove[d] 
to be relatively independent from the legal prohibition of abor-
tion.”262  In a study of German abortion law, Mary Anne Case noted 
that the FCC’s continued constitutional protection of fetal life and re-
fusal to declare unevaluated abortion, or abortion performed after 
counseling, a legal act did not result in an anti-abortion regime, but 
instead resulted in “a compromise many of the leading partici-
pants . . . found attractive enough to be worth trying to preserve.”263  A 
woman in Germany can make the decision to terminate her pregnan-
cy during the first twelve weeks so long as she participates in a state-
regulated counseling process, which, with the exception of the length 
of the waiting period, can be less onerous than the processes in many 
U.S. states.264 
The suspension of legal prosecution for unevaluated pregnancies 
and the application of the revised Pregnancy and Family Assistance 
Act of 1995 have led commentators to argue that Germany, in effect, 
permits abortion by request.265  Almost 97% of abortions occur after 
                                                          
 262.  Werner, supra note 78, at 601; see also Kommers, supra note 19, at 19 (“By 1990, 
public opinion polls were showing that large numbers of West Germans would ease re-
strictions on abortion in early pregnancy.”).  Following a global trend, in 1994, the Basic 
Law was amended to include more explicit protections for women’s rights.  David Law & 
Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 
825 (2012).  This change led to an “abrupt decline” in constitutional similarity between 
the United States and Germany.  Id. 
 263.  Case, supra note 68, at 98–99. 
 264.  See Christian Fiala, Abortion in Europe: Are the Laws and Practices Patient Centred?, 
ENTRE NOUS: THE EUR. MAG. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH, 2005, at 23, 24, tbl.1 (2005), 
available at http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/69763/en59.pdf (de-
scribing Germany’s counseling requirements); STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND 
WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION, supra note 235 (describing the increasingly onerous 
counseling requirements in the United States).  But see Fiala, supra, at 24, tbl.1 (stating that 
the obligatory waiting period in Germany is “[t]hree full days”). 
 265.  Crighton & Ebert, supra note 31, at 24.  Women receive a certificate that proves the 
completion of counseling and that grants them immunity from prosecution.  
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counseling, rather than on the legal grounds of life, health, criminal 
act, or fetal anomaly.266  According to the organization Pro Familia, 
which provides counseling in Germany through a network of centers, 
common reasons patients give for wanting an abortion include the in-
ability to financially support a child, the desire to finish education, 
and the need to seek employment.267  A Pro Familia physician ex-
plained his perception of the counseling requirements: 
The purpose of counseling is to help someone make their 
own decision, not to impose anything.  In 80 percent of the 
cases, the women have already decided to abort before they 
come here.  In those cases, we do not try to change their de-
cision.  The other 20 percent are [g]enuinely unsure of what 
they want, and we can help those make a decision.  More 
and more, we’ve noticed their partners accompanying them.  
But we make sure the decision is always finally the wom-
an’s.268 
In a report issued by the European Women’s Health Network, 
Pro Familia stated its position as letting women decide whether to 
continue pregnancies on their own, “as a consequence of the human 
right to family planning.”269  For women who are undecided, Pro Fa-
milia’s position is that the advice offered must “consider different 
world-views[,] . . . a secular concept of human being, [and women’s] 
individuality, equality of rights and chances, autonomy and toler-
ance.”270  Pro Familia explained that its counseling complied with 
German law because the counseling was consistent with “science and 
                                                          
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBl. I, §§ 218a(1), 219(2) 
(Ger.), translated in THAMAN, supra note 92, at 131, 133. 
 266.  See GESUNDHEITSBERICHTERSTATTUNG DES BUNDES, DATA SOURCES OF THE 
FEDERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE: STATISTICS ON TERMINATIONS OF PREGNANCY,  
http://www.gbe-bund.de/gbe10/hrecherche.prc_herkunft_rech?tk=51310&tk2=51311&p 
_fid=424&p_uid=gast&p_aid=1619436&p_sprache=E&cnt_ut=1&ut=51311 (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2012) (reporting that 105,357 of 108,867 abortions performed in Germany in 2011 
were by reason of the counseling rule). 
 267.  Why Are There More Abortions in Berlin?, EXBERLINER MAG. (June 5, 2008, 7:21 AM), 
http://www.thelocal.de/lifestyle/20080605-12291.html. 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  VERA LASCH ET AL., EUROPEAN WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK, STATE OF AFFAIRS, 
CONCEPTS, APPROACHES, ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HEALTH MOVEMENT, COUNTRY REPORT: 
GERMANY 123 (2000). 
 270.  Id. 
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the respect for the final decision and responsibility of the woman.”271  
Rather than sounding in tones of fetal life and protection of the un-
born, this language hewed more closely to the women’s rights rheto-
ric associated with the international human rights movement.272 
In Germany, a variety of groups with varying ideologies may apply 
for counseling licenses.273  Even the non-profit counseling organiza-
tions aligned with the Catholic Church do not perceive their role as 
obstructing women’s decisions but as “supportive” of women.274  While 
state mandated counseling would appear to contradict women’s rights 
to autonomy,275 the German regime has provided a compromise that 
meets abortion supporters’ goal of permitting access to services, as 
well as abortion opponents’ goal of a system committed to reducing 
the number of abortions.276 
In terms of funding abortion services, the national health insur-
ance scheme in Germany “typically covers abortion procedures if a 
                                                          
 271.  Id. at 124; see also id. at 129 (“The local, provincial and district associations are or-
ganized as member-associations and responsible for more than 160 advice service institu-
tions,” and Pro Familia “is mainly financed by public funds, that means municipal, provin-
cial and national funds”). 
 272.  See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Plena mayo 10, 
2006, Sentencia C-355/2006 (p. 241-49) (Colom.), C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 
25–32. 
 273.  See Lee Ann Banaszak, The Women’s Movement Policy Successes and the Constraints of 
State Reconfiguration: Abortion and Equal Pay in Differing Eras, in WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS 
FACING THE RECONFIGURED STATE 141, 152 (Lee Ann Banaszak et al. eds., 2003) (noting 
that the German counseling requirement “allows groups like Pro Familia to have a very 
different emphasis than Donum Vitae, the Catholic organization involved in abortion 
counseling”). 
 274.  See Case, supra note 68, at 106 (describing the approach of Donum Vitae, a Catho-
lic-aligned counseling center, “that is at its root not finger-wagging, but supportive, whose 
aim is, as the [FCC] required, to ‘show [the pregnant woman] opportunities for a life with 
the child,’ not to threaten her with regret or cancer”) (alteration in original).  Professor 
Case also notes the lengthy debate between Catholic counseling centers and the Vatican, 
culminating in the Vatican’s “unambiguous and insistent directives” that no church entity 
provide counseling.  Id. at 105.  As a result, Catholic lay groups, such as Donum Vitae, now 
provide counseling.  Id. 
 275.  See Nanette Funk, Abortion Counselling and the 1995 German Abortion Law, 12 CONN. 
J. INT’L  L. 33, 60 (1996) (arguing that counseling restricts a woman’s freedom). 
 276.  Case, supra note 68, at 99, 100. 
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medical or criminal indication is present.”277  Unevaluated abortions, 
or those performed after counseling, are not funded as part of the na-
tional insurance scheme.278  As Gerald Neuman noted, whether gov-
ernment money should support abortion services for unevaluated 
abortions is a controversial issue,279 and “[t]he disallowance of pay-
ment for abortions founded on the ‘general situation of need’ was the 
price for permitting women to evaluate their own need.”280  Recall, 
however, that the 1993 FCC decision permits state welfare programs 
to cover the costs of abortions for those women with financial need.281  
Most regional legislatures have interpreted “need” very generously, so 
that in some areas the state pays for almost every abortion.282  Profes-
sor Case noted that “the percentage of state-financed abortions varies 
by region, from approximately 65% in conservative Catholic Bavaria 
to approximately 95% in Nordrhein-Westfalen.”283  In contrast, almost 
60% percent of U.S. women pay out of pocket for their abortion pro-
cedures.284  Only 13% of women receiving abortions in the United 
States rely on state funding, which is almost the flip of the approxi-
mately 16% percent of German women who pay out of pocket.285  
Thus, as Professor Case summarized, in the United States, abortion is 
                                                          
 277.  SUSANNE DIEPER, AM. INST. CONTEMP. GERM. STUD., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ABORTIONS IN GERMANY 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.aicgs.org/issue/the-legal-framework-of-abortions-in-germany/. 
 278.  Cf. id. (“In most other cases, e.g., those performed according to paragraph 218a 
and considered unlawful, the woman has to cover the medical costs herself.”). 
 279.  Neuman, supra note 3, at 286. 
 280.  Id. at 290. 
 281.  Kommers, supra note 19, at 23. 
 282.  Case, supra note 68, at 103.  Professor Case notes that only the woman’s income, 
not her household’s income, is used to establish need.  Id. 
 283.  Id. at 101 n.21. 
 284.  RACHEL K. JONES ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION 
PATIENTS, 2008, at 1 (May 2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/US-
Abortion-Patients.pdf. 
 285.  ADAM SONFIELD ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., PUBLIC FUNDING FOR FAMILY 
PLANNING, STERILIZATION AND ABORTION SERVICES, FY 1980–2006: OCCASIONAL REPORT 
NO. 38, at 6, tbl.A (2008), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/01/28/or 
38.pdf; Elke Thoss & Joachim von Baross, Mifegyne in Germany: Were All the Efforts in Vain?, 
28 CHOICES 26, 28 (2000). 
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“famously protected, but unsubsidized,” but in Germany it is “at once 
condemned and subsidized.”286 
For a country like Germany where the illegality of abortion is a 
consistent point of comparative emphasis, abortion is a “relatively 
simple” process.287  In 2010, there was an average of nearly 161 termi-
nations for every 1,000 live births, a statistic that has declined by ap-
proximately 2 to 3% each year over the last five years.288  German 
abortion rates are the same as or higher than the rates in most of the 
neighboring countries, including Belgium, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands, which have less restrictive abortion laws.289  Although the 
United States has a higher per capita rate of abortion than Germany 
does,290 studies suggest that the rates of abortion in Germany and the 
rest of Western Europe are generally lower than that in the United 
States because of widespread contraceptive use.291 
                                                          
 286.  Case, supra note 68, at 100. 
 287.  FERREE ET AL., supra note 71, at 3. 
 288.  DESTATIS STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, ABORTIONS: ABORTIONS BY PLACE OF 
RESIDENCE OF THE WOMEN AND QUOTA EVERY 1,000 BIRTHS, 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Health/Abortions/Tables/StateO
fResidence.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). A newspaper cited the national abortion rate 
at 15%.  Why Are There More Abortions in Berlin?, supra note 267. 
 289.  Wm. Robert Johnston, Percentage of Pregnancies Aborted by Country 
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/wrjp334pd.html (last updated Mar. 12, 
2012).  In the Netherlands, women may seek an abortion for any reason before viability 
after a five-day waiting period.  UNITED NATIONS POPULATION DIV., DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. 
AFF., ABORTION POLICIES: A GLOBAL REVIEW 159–60 (2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/profiles.htm.  In Belgium, 
women may seek an abortion for any reason before twelve weeks if they receive counseling 
six days in advance.  Id. at 54–55.  In Switzerland, women may seek an abortion to avoid 
“danger to [their] li[ves] or serious danger of severe and lasting injury to [their] health.”  
Id. at 116–17.  The law does not set a time limit or require counseling.  Id. 
 290.  UNdata, the online compilation of United Nations’s statistics, reports that the 
United States’ rate for abortion is approximately twice that of Germany, as well as those of 
Germany’s neighbors, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.  See UNDATA, 
ABORTION RATE, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3A12#f_1 (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2012) (reporting data from 2003 for the United States and Belgium and 
data from 2004 for Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands). 
 291.  See Susan A. Cohen, New Data on Abortion Incidence, Safety Illuminate Key Aspects of 
Worldwide Abortion Debate, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Fall 2007, at 2, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/4/gpr100402.html (summarizing findings 
from a study conducted by the Guttmacher Institute and the World Health Organization). 
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This is not to minimize the complexity of German abortion poli-
tics or to suggest that abortion has not been a contentious issue,292 
although the public discourse and debate are nothing like they are in 
the United States.293  As in the United States, different regions of 
Germany have reacted differently to abortion.294  The highest abortion 
rates are in the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin.295  In Berlin in 
2006, one in four pregnancies ended in abortion.296  But some regions 
of the country are notoriously unfriendly to abortion.  States like Ba-
varia, for example, restrict the provision of abortion by limiting physi-
cians’ income from termination services.297 
                                                          
 292.  One contemporary debate, which resulted in revisions to the Pregnancy and Fami-
ly Assistance Act, has been the lack of mandated counseling for women seeking abortion 
because of fetal anomaly, a “medically necessary” ground for legal abortion.  See Daniela 
Reitz & Gerd Richter, Current Changes in German Abortion Law, 19 CAMBRIDGE Q. 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 334, 334–35 (2010) (describing the debate). 
 293.  See Ferree & Gamson, supra note 19, at 42 (contrasting the U.S. and German de-
bates between abortion supporters and opponents); see also Crighton & Ebert, supra note 
31, at 15–17 (noting that the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act of 1992 was a compro-
mise between progressive and conservative forces in Germany and that the 1995 revisions 
took “an ambivalent position on abortion”). 
 294.  See, e.g., DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 347–48 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that in West Germany, abor-
tion was generally a criminal offense whereas East Germany permitted abortion on de-
mand). 
 295.  ABORTIONS: ABORTIONS BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF THE WOMEN AND QUOTA EVERY 
1,000 BIRTHS, supra note 288.  Abortion rates in the former East German states are gener-
ally higher than those in the former West German states: rates range from 167 abortions 
for every 1,000 births in Saxony to over 230 for every 1,000 in Saxony-Anhalt.  Id.  In the 
former West Germany, rates range almost 111 abortions per 1,000 births in Bavaria to 167 
in Hessen.  Id. 
 296.  Why Are There More Abortions in Berlin?, supra note 267.  Ease of access to required 
counseling may play a role because, unlike non-urban areas, Berlin has twenty-five counsel-
ing institutions and about 190 physicians licensed to counsel women.  Id. 
 297.  See Funk, supra note 275, at 55 (discussing a regional law requiring women to give 
reasons for abortion and reimbursing insurance costs of abortion only for needy women).  
Indeed, Bavaria was a petitioner to the FCC in the 1993 FCC decision, arguing that cover-
age of unevaluated abortions under the national health insurance scheme violated the 
Basic Law.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 
1993, 88 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203 (232, 237) 
(Ger.) (translation provided by author).  Bavaria also tried to restrict outpatient abortion 
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German abortion law is not simple, but, contrary to how it is 
characterized by the national court decisions discussed in Part II, it is 
not simply a reflection of an anti-abortion agenda.298  Yet the use of 
comparative law by foreign courts embraces an American-German 
duality and oversimplifies the practice of abortion in each country.  
The next Part explains the roots of the dominant model of compara-
tive law and why it is difficult, though not impossible, to envision a dif-
ferently-styled comparative method. 
IV.  ENTRENCHED COMPARISONS: MODERNITY AND INFORMALITY 
Courts and advocates are blind—perhaps willfully blind in some 
cases—to the distance between the constitutional symbols they evoke 
and the worlds those symbols represent.  As argued in Part II, this gap 
is problematic at one level because it leads to specious judicial reason-
ing in particular cases.  This gap, however, is also problematic for 
broader reasons.  When courts cite foreign law, they often refer to a 
principle or abstraction of law removed from its original context,299 
for varying goals and motives.300  In the context of contemporary abor-
tion decisions, when courts refer to the United States or to Germany, 
they situate their judgments among those of modern nations that 
have liberal or restrictive abortion laws.301  Courts’ use of comparative 
law arguably has more to do with political choices courts make to jus-
                                                          
services and to permit searches of physicians’ offices for evidence of illegal abortion pro-
cedures.  FERREE ET AL., supra note 71, at 43.  The FCC struck down these provisions.  Id. 
 298.  See FERREE ET AL., supra note 71, at 43 (mapping the changing public discourse of 
abortion in Germany). 
 299.  See Knop, supra note 16, at 67–68 (describing how “state law can become disem-
bedded from its state”).  There is a rich literature on how and why these conversations 
happen between courts of different countries.  See generally Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in 
Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 
819 (1999); David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 
WASH. L. REV. 523 (2011); Anne Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 191 (2003); Anne Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 
U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of 
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 
(2005). 
 300.  See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
459, 461–62 (2010) (citing transplantation and displacement as goals). 
 301.  See supra Part II. 
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tify their decisions than with fidelity to foreign law.302  As Part II dis-
cussed, the United States and Germany serve as proxies for women’s 
rights or fetal rights, respectively, giving courts a language to situate 
their opinions in national priorities and politics. 
This Part explores why the comparative method on which courts 
and advocates rely has such broad political appeal and why this meth-
od travels.  It begins by demonstrating that courts draw heavily from 
the comparative analysis of advocates’ amicus briefs in ways that per-
petuate and strengthen the current rights-based approach.303  In par-
ticular, the animating and familiar themes for court opinions and ad-
vocates’ briefs are modernity and universality, which translate into re-
reform strategies that inevitably omit important considerations, like 
the delivery of abortion services.  It concludes with tentative reflec-
tions on what a move away from the formalism of the current method 
may look like.304 
A.  The Source of Current Comparisons 
The court decisions discussed in this Article are deeply embed-
ded in a larger conversation about the convergence of global constitu-
tionalism and human rights norms.305  Courts specifically refer to oth-
er countries’ experiences as evidence of this convergence.  For 
example, in elaborating on the meaning of liberty, the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia restated the Colombian Attorney General’s argu-
ment that “[t]he power to choose different life choices defines man in 
the modern world, as the founders of modern theory consider this au-
thority as inherent to the human condition.”306  Likewise, the Su-
preme Court of Appeal of South Africa quoted at length from the 
work of American political theorist Ronald Dworkin who argued that 
the principles of liberty and privacy indicative of “western political 
                                                          
 302.  See supra Part II. 
 303.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 304.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 305.  See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the Postconflict 
State, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 301, 303 (2010) (noting the preoccupation of comparative 
constitutional law with “The Rights Revolution”). 
 306.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Plena mayo 10, 2006, 
Sentencia C-355/2006, (p. 172–73) (Colom.) (translation provided by author). 
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culture” include women’s rights to autonomy and support rights to 
abortion.307 
However, the examples that national courts cite come from a 
narrow band of experience: the constitutionalism of rights found in 
the United States and Germany.308  Courts in Colombia and South Af-
rica, for example, speak to global trends when their countries are out-
liers in their own regions.  As the Colombian Constitutional Court 
noted, countries that heavily restrict abortion or ban all abortion sur-
round Colombia.309  In addition, South Africa has the most liberal 
abortion law on the African continent.310  And, interestingly, South 
Africa adopted a constitution that both reflects human rights and pro-
tects customary practices.311  Yet the Supreme Court of Appeal chose 
to cite Dworkin, writing about “western political culture,”312 rather 
than customary practices that historically permitted abortion.313  The 
exclusion of non-Western sources of comparison led many to question 
whether the consensus-driven agenda of comparative citation is a 
practice defined by and supportive of only Western, and primarily 
U.S., interests.314 
                                                          
 307.  See Christian Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Minister of Health 2004 (4) All SA 31 (SCA) at 43–
44 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 103–04, 106–07 (1994)) (describing 
Dworkin’s conclusions that the U.S. Constitution protects “personal privacy” as well as “the 
woman’s freedom to determine the fate of her own pregnancy”). 
 308.  See infra Part II. 
 309.  See infra notes 117–118 and accompanying text. 
 310.  See Charles Ngwena, An Appraisal of Abortion Laws in Southern Africa from a Reproduc-
tive Health Rights Perspective, 32 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 708, 709, 711 (2004) (noting that 
most African countries permit abortion only to protect the physical health or life of the 
mother). 
 311.  See T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 42–43 (2004) (discussing 
when courts are “constitutionally obliged to apply customary law”); Tracy E. Higgins et al., 
Gender Equality and Customary Marriage: Bargaining in the Shadow of Post-Apartheid Legal Plu-
ralism, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1653, 1654 (2007) (describing how the South African Con-
stitution protects “rights to culture and religious freedom”). 
 312.  See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
 313.  See Ngwena, supra note 310, at 711 (“A common feature of early colonial abortion 
law was the criminalization of abortion save where abortion was necessary to save the life of 
the mother.”). 
 314.  See e.g., Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 522 (2000) (describing scholarship that maps how comparative and 
international law often serves legal and market interests of the United States, although it 
claims no political agenda). 
  
140 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:85 
National courts appear to respond by framing comparative cita-
tion, though narrowly drawn, as exemplary of claims of universal 
rights.315  Thus, instead of engaging questions of culture or context, 
the court decisions described here anchor abortion reform in human 
rights principles that, according to description and design, are univer-
sally applicable.316  For example, the Supreme Court of Mexico, in be-
ginning its judgment upholding limited abortion on request, stated: 
Abortion has to do with human rights, the notion corre-
sponds to the assertion of the dignity of the person.  Con-
temporary society recognizes that all human beings have 
rights that must be respected and guaranteed by the State, 
characteristics, which are inherent to the human person, in-
alienable, universal, integral and progressive.317 
The Constitutional Court of Portugal similarly justified its liberal-
ized abortion law, a model “widely prevalent” in Europe,318 as compli-
ant with human rights standards.319  Supporting this view, a circular 
issued by Portugal’s Ministry of Health stated, “the government’s re-
cent decriminalization of abortion represents a move toward joining 
the most modern, developed and open European societies.”320  Like-
                                                          
 315.  See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 21–28 (1990) (arguing 
that the appeal of modern international law is its ability to transform local ideals into prin-
ciples that are globally applicable). 
 316.  See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Dignity and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity in Transnational Debates 
over Abortion and Same-Sex Marriage, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 20–22 (2012) (discussing hu-
man rights as the foundation for both the U.S. and German approaches to abortion). 
 317.  Acción De Inconstitucionalidad, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] 
[Supreme Court], Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, Página 72 (Mex.), available at 
http://www.equidad.scjn.gob.mx/IMG/pdf/ENGROSECOSSxcdO-146-07.pdf (translation 
provided by Marcelina Alvrim and on file with the author). 
 318.  T.C., Acórdão No. 733/07, Relator: Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, 23.02.2010, 60, 
DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2.ª SÉRIE [D.R.], 26.03.2010, 15566, 15582–83 (Port.) (translation 
provided by Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author).  The majority opinion lists four-
teen European countries that permit abortion for any reason within varying time limits 
and notes which of those countries require counseling.  Id. at 15582–83 (listing the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Macedonia, Turkey, Estonia, Neth-
erlands, Romania, Sweden, Greece, Denmark, France, and Austria). 
 319.  Id. at 15582–84 (calling this the “model of time”). 
 320.  DIRECÇÃO-GERAL DA SAÚDE, CIRCULAR NORMATIVA NO. 11/SR: ORGANIZAÇÃO DOS 
SERVIÇOS PARA IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DE LEI 16/2007 DE 17 DE ABRIL (translation provided by 
Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author). 
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wise, the Constitutional Court of Colombia justified its decision by 
writing: 
 Various international treaties form the basis for the recog-
nition and protection of women’s reproductive rights, which 
derive from the protection of other fundamental rights such 
as the right to life, health, equality, the right to be free from 
discrimination, the right to liberty, bodily integrity and the 
right to be free from violence.321 
Although specific international standards cited by national courts 
range from non-binding declarations to treaties, the purpose of refer-
ring to international human rights is to show agreement among coun-
tries around limited abortion reform.322  This role for comparative law 
as instrumental in the broader diffusion of rights is of course not 
unique to movements for reproductive rights.323 
Claiming consensus on abortion rights is contested: Global 
trends may point in the direction of decriminalization, but arguably 
no single legislative or judicial formulation dominates law reform.324  
                                                          
 321.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Plena mayo 10, 2006, 
Sentencia C-355/2006, (p. 245) (Colom.), C-355/2006 EXCERPTS, supra note 12, at 27. 
 322.  See Christina Zampas & Jamie Gher, Abortion as a Human Right: International and 
Regional Approaches, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 255 (2008) (explaining that protection of 
abortion rights under international human rights law “hinges on whether a woman’s life 
or health is at risk, the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest or there is risk of foetal im-
pairment”); see also Rebecca Cook & Bernard Dickens, Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion 
Law Reform, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 2 (2003) (arguing that “[m]odern momentum for liberali-
zation comes from international adoption of the concept of reproductive health”); 
Rosalind Dixon & Martha Nussbaum, Abortion, Dignity and a Capabilities Approach, in 
FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 64, 66 (Beverley Baines et al. eds., 
2012) (noting that “[t]here have also been numerous attempts, both judicial and scholar-
ly, to connect th[e theoretical] idea of dignity [developed in the Western tradition] to the 
specific abortion context”). 
 323.  Duncan Kennedy, for example, has described the contemporary diffusion of law as 
that which is distinctly marked by the balancing of rights and a neo-formalism as to what 
universally applicable rights can accomplish.  Kennedy, supra note 23, at 65.  
 324.  See Rosalind Dixon & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Convergence, 11 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 399, 405–06 (2011) (arguing that there is a “quite clear trend toward liber-
alization in recent years,” but not “clear convergence toward a single global position”).  
But see RITA JOSEPH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNBORN CHILD xviii (2009) (arguing that the 
right to life for the unborn has more support in international human rights law than the 
right to abortion); Richard G. Wilkins & Jacob Reynolds, International Law and the Right to 
Life, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123, 125 (2006) (arguing that modern advocacy for the right to 
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The extent to which courts characterize abortion as a woman’s right, 
however, marks the influence of a global movement for reproductive 
health and rights.  It has been a central goal of women’s rights 
movements to build consensus for expanded abortion rights globally.  
And to that end, over the last several decades, international and na-
tional women’s rights organizations have made significant gains in 
marrying human rights and women’s reproductive health.325  Reva 
Siegel recently mapped how feminists successfully challenged crimi-
nal abortion laws in the 1960s and 1970s by arguing in favor of wom-
en’s rights to control their reproductive lives and against state imposi-
tion of traditional sexual mores.326  United States and German 
abortion jurisprudence reflects that activism, responding to and in-
corporating feminist claims from the 1970s through the 1990s.327 
Since the 1990s, women’s rights groups have won notable legal 
battles.328  Indeed, reproductive rights advocates have supported the 
use of comparative and international law by submitting amicus briefs 
to the courts in the decisions discussed above.329  In the cases de-
scribed in Part II, courts lifted comparative examples directly from 
the advocates’ writings.  The extent to which courts rely on advocates’ 
arguments, which are similarly rooted in modernity and universality, 
                                                          
abortion supplants the history of human rights documents and ignores national laws that 
protect unborn life). 
 325.  See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, ABORTION WORLDWIDE: TWELVE YEARS OF 
REFORM 1 (2007) (noting that international principles “reflect a global trend toward abor-
tion law liberalization—a trend that first gained momentum in the late 1960s and contin-
ues to this day”); Laura Reichenbach, The Global Reproductive Health and Rights Agenda: Op-
portunities and Challenges for the Future, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
WAY FORWARD 26 (Laura Reichenbach & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2009) (noting the 
transition in law’s focus from population and development to women’s empowerment and 
citing the International Conference on Population and Development). 
 326.  Siegel, Constitutionalization of Abortion, supra note 20, at 1060–64.  Feminist inter-
vention in transnational debates is longstanding.  See Vicki C. Jackson, Gender and Transna-
tional Discourse, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377, 378 (2002) (noting that feminists have always  
“use[d] law at the local, national, and international levels”). 
 327.  Siegel, Constitutionalization of Abortion, supra note 20, at 1066–71 (arguing that, 
from Roe to Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court shifted its focus from physician decisionmaking 
to women’s autonomy, and that likewise, from the 1975 FCC decision to the 1993 FCC de-
cision, the FCC shifted from rhetoric on mothers’ duties to produce life to a counseling 
system that afforded women more discretion). 
 328.  See supra Part II. 
 329.  See infra notes 332–355 and accompanying text. 
  
2012] COMPARATIVE PRAGMATISM 143 
speaks to the power of reproductive rights rhetoric330 and its ability to 
travel.331 
For example, the use of foreign case law by the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia tracked the arguments made in an amicus brief 
that was written by a coalition of local and international women’s 
rights groups.332  In citing the 1975 FCC decision, the brief argued 
that even countries with restrictive laws, like Germany, recognize key 
human rights points.333  Mirroring the court’s opinion, the same brief 
described the U.S. approach to balancing women’s rights and state 
interests in potential life by citing Roe.334  In addition, these advocates 
urged the Constitutional Court to recognize the convergence around 
abortion liberalization across the world, although their examples 
came almost exclusively from the global North.335  The brief argued: 
Despite their differences, however, all [European and North 
American courts] permit abortion in at least three specific 
situations: (1) where pregnancy poses a threat to the life or 
health of the pregnant woman; (2) where the fetus suffers 
from physical and/or serious mental defects; and (3) where 
the pregnancy resulted from rape.  Failing to recognize 
these three exceptions falls below the minimum standards 
                                                          
 330.  See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM 
FEMINISM 20–22 (2006) (describing the governance power of feminism, which at the in-
ternational level, can be seen “running things” through “‘nongovernmental organizations’ 
that strategize hard—sometimes successfully—to become indispensable when major new 
fluidities in formal power emerge”). 
 331.  Cook & Dickens, supra note 322, at 3–5. 
 332.  Intervención de Terceros, preparada por el Centro de Derechos Reproductivos et 
al.,  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C-
355/2006 (Colom.) (translation provided by Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author). 
 333.  Id. at 6.  The brief, for example, focused on the 1993 FCC decision’s balancing of 
the fetus’s interests with the burden that pregnancy would impose upon women.  Id. at 7. 
 334.  Id. at 13–14.  Unlike the majority opinion, however, which ignored Casey, the brief 
cited Casey to argue that the balancing test of Roe, balancing women’s right to privacy with 
the state interest in protecting the fetus, remained the dominant approach of the U.S. Su-
preme Court.  Id. at 14–15.  The brief also noted that in Casey, the Supreme Court re-
placed the trimester framework established by Roe with an “undue burden” test until viabil-
ity, arguing that in regulating post-viability abortions states may weigh women’s liberty 
interests against those of a post-viability fetus.  Id. 
 335.  Id. at 3–4 (citing only two countries outside of North America and Western Eu-
rope: Australia and Guyana). 
  
144 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:85 
that have been widely accepted as necessary to protect a 
woman’s fundamental rights to life, health and dignity.336 
Adopting these arguments in its opinion, the Constitutional Court de-
scribed the authors of the brief as “international authorities” that 
monitor and hold governments accountable.337 
Similarly, in the South African litigation, a brief filed on behalf of 
the Reproductive Rights Alliance, which was composed of interna-
tional and national advocates leading the campaign for the CTOPA, 
outlined the comparative arguments that surfaced in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s opinion.338  The brief referred to “three basic hu-
man rights norms that protect reproductive rights: freedom, human 
dignity and equality,”339 and then proceeded to rely on U.S. law and 
legal literature.340  For example, the brief cited a law review article by 
Professor Cass Sunstein to argue that judges, in deference to the legis-
lature, should review equality rights guaranteed in legislation like the 
CTOPA on the basis of rationality.341  Interestingly, South African 
courts have never employed the tiered scrutiny of equality rights that 
would have made Professor Sunstein’s argument relevant.342 
                                                          
 336.  Id. at 3. 
 337.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Plena mayo 10, 2006, 
Sentencia C-355/2006 (p. 176–86) (Colom.) (translation provided by Marcelina Alvrim 
and on file with author). 
 338.  Heads of Argument on Behalf of the Reproductive Rights Alliance, at 28–34 [here-
inafter Brief for Reproductive Rights Alliance], Christian Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Minister of Health 
2004 (4) All SA 31 (SCA) at 42–47 (No. 7728/2001) (brief on file with author). 
 339.  Id. at 28. 
 340.  Id. at 15–19, 30–32. 
 341.  Id. at 13–14.  The brief states that “the provisions of the CTOPA manifestly meet 
the requirements of rationality” because, according to Professor Sunstein, rational basis 
review is an “extremely deferential means-ends scrutiny.”  Id.  However, the Sunstein arti-
cle, written in 1984, addressed the development of U.S. constitutional law generally.  One 
might also notice that Sunstein, in the article cited in the brief, was not making a case for 
rational basis review in the ways the brief implies.  See Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and 
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1696–97, 1700 (1984) (arguing that a deferential 
form of scrutiny, “accounts for much of modern constitutional doctrine,” and that “ration-
ality review—reflects a strong presumption that a public value is at work”). 
 342.  The Colombian Constitutional Court also referenced the work of Professor Sun-
stein.  After citing the holding of Roe, the court cited from a chapter titled Pornography, 
Abortion, Surrogacy in Sunstein’s book, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).  C.C., Senten-
cia C-355/2006 (p. 278 n.113). 
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In arguing that the South African Constitution protects a right to 
an abortion,343 the Reproductive Rights Alliance brief (like the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Appeal) quoted from Ronald Dworkin’s 
book, Life’s Dominion, in support of termination of pregnancy rights 
grounded in procreative autonomy.344  The brief excerpted Dworkin’s 
argument, ultimately quoted by the court, that autonomy understood 
as a dignitarian right is important “not only in the structure of the 
U.S. Constitution but in western political culture more generally.”345 
But recall that the South African litigation dealt with the ques-
tion of minors’ abortions without parental approval.346  The brief, as 
well as the Supreme Court of Appeal’s opinion, considered select U.S. 
cases as support for the unconstitutionality of parental consent laws.347  
For example, as evidence that parental involvement laws are “contrary 
to comparative case law,” the brief quoted from cases interpreting pa-
rental involvement laws in California and Florida.348  The brief, how-
ever, ignored Casey’s approval of a parental consent law and the many 
states, including Florida and previously California, that enacted con-
sent or notice statutes.349  Advocates are, of course, entitled to make 
                                                          
 343.  Cf. Rebouché, Reproductive Rights, supra note 149, at 18 (noting that drafters of the 
South African Constitution appeared hesitant to create an explicit right to an abortion 
and, instead, left the articulation of specific abortion rights to legislation). 
 344.  Compare Brief for Reproductive Rights Alliance, supra note 338, at 15–18, with 
Christian Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Minister of Health 2004 (4) All SA 31 (SCA) at 43–44. 
 345.  Brief for Reproductive Rights Alliance, supra note 338, at 17. 
 346.  See supra Part II.B. 
 347.  Christian Lawyers’ 2004 (4) All SA at 44–45 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)); Brief for Reproductive Rights Alliance, supra note 338, at 21, 
30–33 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), for the 
proposition that requiring spousal consent for a woman’s abortion decision is an unconsti-
tutional burden on women’s rights). 
 348.  Brief for Reproductive Rights Alliance, supra note 338, at 30–33 (citing Am. Acad-
emy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 
1989)). 
 349.  In 2012, “[thirty-seven] states require some type of parental involvement in a mi-
nor’s decision to have an abortion,” whether through consent, notification, or both.  
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS 1–2 (Oct. 
1, 2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf.  Cali-
fornia’s parental involvement law is permanently enjoined and not in effect.  Id. at 2.  In-
terestingly, the Florida and California cases cited in the brief did not end the controversy 
of minors’ abortion in either state.  Florida amended its state constitution to permit a new 
  
146 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:85 
the strongest arguments they believe support their cause.  However, 
the Reproductive Rights Alliance brief, like the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s opinion, had to read out significant aspects of U.S. law and 
practice to express support for women’s rights associated with Roe. 
Advocates’ briefs reveal how rights-based strategies travel in rela-
tively consistent and decontextualized ways.  Women are either rights 
bearers (in regimes with new, permissive laws) or victims (in regimes 
with criminal sanctions).350  Advocates have also argued that criminal 
abortion laws target women and impose violence on them—a type of 
victimization that is shared universally by women in restrictive legal 
systems.351  Thus, feminist engagement in litigation not only focuses 
                                                          
parental involvement law after the Florida Supreme Court struck down a previous law.  See 
N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Servs. v. Florida, 866 So. 2d 612, 615 (Fla. 2003) 
(striking down Florida’s 1999 parental notice statute in June 2003).  The state constitu-
tional amendment, section 22, requires parental notice before abortion.  FLA. STAT. 
§ 390.01114 (West 2007) (effective 2006).  In California, a state ballot proposition on pa-
rental notice narrowly failed to pass in 2005, 2006, and 2008.  PROPOSITION 4: WAITING 
PERIOD AND PARENTAL NOTIFICATION BEFORE TERMINATION OF MINOR’S PREGNANCY, 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/state/ 
prop/4/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012); SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION, NOVEMBER 8, 2005: 
STATE BALLOT MEASURES, http://vote2005.sos.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2012); VOTE SUMMARIES: OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE 
GENERAL ELECTION HELD ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2006, THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA ON STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES SUBMITTED TO A VOTE OF ELECTORS, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2006_general/sum_amended.pdf (last visited Oct. 
15, 2012).  As of October 2012, California’s parental involvement law was permanently en-
joined and not in effect.  STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS, su-
pra, at 2. 
 350.  See supra notes 332–345 and accompanying text. 
 351.  Maternal mortality and morbidity rates are often cited in this regard.  See Lance 
Gable, Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957, 965–66 (2010) 
(describing the number of illegal abortions estimated globally as abortions that are un-
safe).  Public health literature (and some legal literature) exhibits an increasing discon-
tent with the assumption that all illegal abortion is unsafe abortion.  See Joanna N. Erd-
man, Access to Information on Safe Abortion: A Harm Reduction and Human Rights Approach, 34 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 413, 413–14 (2011) (discussing the unworkable distinction between 
safe and unsafe abortions); see also Anne Orford, Feminism, Imperialism, and the Mission of 
International Law, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 275, 277–78 (2002) (describing feminist interven-
tion in international law generally as a strategy concerned with universalized harm to 
women). 
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on winning rights for women, but also on protecting women from 
harm. 
In this way, the briefs of women’s rights groups (and the national 
court opinions that cite to them) link rights to abortion with the 
avoidance of injury caused by illegal abortion.  For example, in the 
debate leading up to the Supreme Court of Mexico’s 2007 decision, a 
large and diverse number of groups took action in support of the 
Mexico City law.352  The Assembly of the Federal District of Mexico 
City stated that its motivation in revising the city’s penal and health 
codes was to deter illegal or unsafe abortions.353  Amicus briefs from 
national and international organizations continued the work of the 
public campaign before the Supreme Court.354  An amicus brief sub-
mitted by the U.S. non-profit organization, the National Abortion 
Fund, concluded “[a]s the experience in many other countries has 
shown, decriminalization of abortion will reduce mortality and mor-
bidity among women seeking abortions and thereby improve public 
health.”355 
Similarly, in Portugal, the Constitutional Court’s decision reflects 
women’s rights advocates’ insistence that if the law did not allow abor-
tions in limited circumstances, women would inevitably seek danger-
                                                          
 352.  Mexican civil society organizations sponsored a discussion seminar entitled “Abor-
tion, an Open Debate,” which featured “academics, researchers in the fields of medicine, 
law, philosophy, and biology, members of the civil society, [government] officials, and 
members of political parties.”  NORMA UBALDI GARCETE, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
ABORTION LAW IN MEXICO CITY 27 (2010). 
 353.  Madrazo & Vela, supra note 203, at 1874–75. 
 354.  See Written Comments by the Int’l Reprod. & Sexual Health Law Programme, 
Faculty of Law, Univ. of Toronto at 3 [hereinafter Brief for Int’l Reprod. & Sexual Health 
Law Programme], Acción De Inconstitucionalidad, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia 
[SCJN] [Supreme Court], Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, available at 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/reprohealth/BriefMexicoEnglish.pdf (arguing 
that removing punitive provisions would be in accordance with the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action); see also Written Comments by Nat’l Abortion Fed. at 7 [hereinaf-
ter Brief for Nat’l Abortion Fed.], Acción De Inconstitucionalidad, Pleno de la Suprema 
Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Agosto de 2008, 146/2007, available at 
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/international/NAF_a
micus_mx_en.pdf (concluding that “[t]he reforms of the [Mexican] Decree are important 
measures to improve women’s access to sexual and reproductive health care services”).   
 355.  Brief for Nat’l Abortion Fed., supra note 354, at 2–5, 7. 
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ous, illegal terminations.356  The court wrote of “the empirical reality 
of social life” and “incontrovertible data gathered from past experi-
ence” that the public, as well as state officials, did not want to prose-
cute women for early abortions.357  Crucial to the court’s acceptance 
of these arguments were the reproductive rights groups that inter-
vened early in debates about abortion358 and argued that Portugal’s 
restrictive abortion law put women’s lives at risk.359  The majority of 
the court reasoned that national values resistant to abortion generally 
must give way to concerns for women’s health.360 
The fixed nature of these strategies and narratives means that the 
recurrent actors in litigation rarely step outside their roles to see 
something other than powerful states enforcing or not enforcing 
                                                          
 356.  See T.C., Acórdão No. 733/07, Relator: Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, 23.02.2010, 60, 
DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2.ª SÉRIE [D.R.], 26.03.2010, 15566, 15581–82 (Port.) (translation 
provided by Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author). 
 357.  Id. at 15581.  Moreover, the court held that policing women’s procreative choices 
has been historically difficult for the state to do well.  Id. 
 358.  Women’s rights groups, like the Association for Family Planning, pointed to the 
thousands of women who required hospital treatment because of unsafe abortions as ex-
amples of the effects of the criminal law.  APF (ASS’N PARA O PLANEAMENTO DA FAMÍLIA), 
DISCUSSÕES PÚBLICAS E POSIÇÕES DA APF, 
http://www.apf.pt/apf.php?area=300&mid=003&sid=001 (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (list-
ing documents of the organization prepared for the campaign to decriminalize abortion); 
MPE MÉDICOS PELA ESCOLHA, QUEM SOMOS, http://www.medicos 
pelaescolha.pt/acerca/quem-somos/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (translation provided by 
Marcelina Alvrim and on file with author).  In 1984 and 1985, two decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Portugal authorized abortion for medical and humanitarian reasons (to 
save the woman’s life, and in instances of fetal abnormalities and rape).  See Diniz, supra 
note 171, at 1 (discussing the 1984 and 1985 cases).  For a general discussion of the influ-
ence of Catholicism on the abortion debate in Portugal during this period, see Paul Man-
ual & Maurya Tollefsen, Roman Catholicism, Secularization and the Recovery of Traditional 
Communal Values: The 1998 and 2007 Referenda on Abortion in Portugal, 13 S. EUR. SOC. & 
POL. 117, 117–127 (2008). 
 359.  See Diana Curado, Portugal, 3 Years of Legal, Safe and Free Abortion, IWL-FI (Dec. 13, 
2010), http://www.litci.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1748 
(describing the “pro-choice” movement that “campaigned on the streets and on televi-
sion”). 
 360.  T.C., Acórdão No. 733/07, 60, D.R., 15582 (Port.).  But see Janine P. Holc, The Pur-
est Democrat: Fetal Citizenship and Subjectivity in the Construction of Democracy in Poland, 29 
SIGNS 755, 756–58 (2004) (demonstrating that anti-choice advocates solidify and support 
nationalist identities by resisting abortion reform). 
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rights.361  Totalizing harm, like human rights, can sideline women’s 
practical engagement with abortion services, legal or illegal. The next 
Section suggests that the focus on the comparative constitutional law 
of the global North translates to the specific marginalization of extra-
legal or informal conduct. 
B.  Pragmatic Comparisons 
The dominant approach to comparative law in abortion cases 
may help legitimize the political choices of courts, but does so in for-
malist terms362 that funnel law reform into predetermined molds for 
legal grounds or legal permission.363  Consider a map of the world’s 
abortion laws, published by the Center for Reproductive Rights.364  
Countries are shaded a different color depending on whether the 
country prohibits abortion altogether or permits abortion only to save 
the woman’s life, permits abortion to preserve physical health, per-
mits abortion to preserve mental health, permits abortion on socioec-
onomic grounds, or permits abortion without restriction as to rea-
                                                          
 361.  See HALLEY, supra note 330, at 33 (describing a “textbook case of bad faith” when 
feminists will not see other forms of power or justice projects); Peer Zumbansen, Compara-
tive, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational Legal-
Pluralist Order, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 16, 26 (2012) (speaking of comparative 
constitutional law that is wedded to rights and to state enforcement as “only seeing what 
we set out to see”). 
 362.  The critique of comparativism as being overly formalist is longstanding.  Compara-
tive inquiries of the late 1800s and early 1900s were “dubious and non-scientific typologies 
of the world’s legal systems based on a crude evolutionary model of social and legal devel-
opment.”  Riles, supra note 34, at 228.  Fernanda Nicola details two camps within modern 
comparative law: one committed to harmonizing laws (using law to accomplish a social 
purpose) and one accepting and approving of divergence (mapping the divergent mean-
ings and purposes of law).  Fernanda Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 
58 AM. J. COMP. L. 777, 785 (2010). 
 363.  In this vein, it is interesting to consider how, in the United States, grounds for 
abortion were originally tailored to serve specific health purposes.  For example, grounds 
to preserve life and health were at one time responsive to the realities of pregnancy and 
childbirth: “At the time [criminal abortion laws] were adopted, there were in fact many 
indications for life-saving abortions . . . .  By the 1960s, however, advances in medicine 
meant that it was only a rare case where a pregnant women’s life could be said to be at 
stake.”  GLENDON, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
 364.  CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THE WORLD’S ABORTION LAWS 2007, available at 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Abortion%20M
ap_FA.pdf. 
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son.365  The picture is striking: the northern half of the world is mostly 
green, connoting abortion on request, whereas the southern half of 
the map is in shades of red, connoting abortion only to save the wom-
an’s life or to protect physical health.366  Because of its format and 
function, however, the map cannot (and is not intended to) represent 
the nuances of how law is implemented, interpreted, or ignored.  
Fernanda Nicola has described this type of comparative methodology 
as “comparison by columns,” or “comparing the language of legal 
norms understood as positive law in specific legal regimes.”367 
Yet comparative inquiry could be a platform to consider how law 
intersects with the local practices and attitudes.368  Studies in Colom-
bia, for example, demonstrate that self-induced abortion via over-the-
counter drugs persists even for women who could have obtained legal 
abortions.369  The same can be said of South Africa, where the number 
of abortions performed outside the parameters of the CTOPA re-
mains high, despite legal permission for abortion on request until the 
twelfth week of pregnancy.370  Women in Mexico City continue to seek 
private, and thus unsubsidized, abortion services because they expect 
confidentiality, better quality health care, and the absence of bureau-
cratic hurdles or health care professionals with conscientious objec-
tions.371 
                                                          
 365.  Id. 
 366.  Id. 
 367.  Nicola, supra note 362, at 785. 
 368.  See, e.g., Aníbal Faúndes & Ellen Hardy, Illegal Abortion: Consequences for Women’s 
Health and the Health Care System, 58 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 77, 79–80 (1997) 
(providing examples of countries, like India, where abortion is legal for any reason yet 
high rates of abortions performed outside legal parameters persist, and countries where 
laws are restrictive yet women access illegal services frequently, like Romania, Mozam-
bique, Chile, Brazil, and Bangladesh). 
 369.  Eduardo Amado et al., Obstacles and Challenges Following the Partial Decriminalization 
of Abortion in Colombia, 18 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 118, 118–21 (2010); see also Jennifer 
Lee & Cara Buckley, For Privacy’s Sake, Taking Risks to End Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 
2009, at A15 (revealing that in Latina immigrant enclaves in Upper Manhattan miso-
prostol is “frequently employed”). 
 370.  Banwari Meel & Ram P. Kaswa, The Impact on the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy 
Act of 1996, 36 AFR. J. PRIMARY HEALTH CARE & FAM. MED. 1, 1 (2009). 
 371.  Raffaela Schiavon et al., Characteristics of Private Abortion Services in Mexico City After 
Legalization, 18 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 127, 128 (2010); see also Daniel Grossman et al., 
Self Induction of Abortion Among Women in the United States, 18 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 
136, 140–42 (2010) (noting that in the United States, women self-induce because of cost 
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This evidence, largely drawn from public health literature, sug-
gests that not only do extralegal methods persist after law reform, but 
also that new legislation or court decisions may result in bureaucracy, 
backlash, and stress on state resources.  This insight has three im-
portant consequences for women’s health.  First, reform concentrated 
on legal grounds might inadvertently shut down avenues currently 
open to women or construct new obstacles to service delivery.  Cyra 
Choudhury, for example, argues that new bureaucratic and potential-
ly cumbersome processes can deter women from seeking legal termi-
nations.372  Indeed, one recent study revealed that of forty-six Colom-
bian women, thirty-six had requests for legal terminations denied 
after a “protracted bureaucratic process, requiring several medical or 
legal referrals.”373 
Second, creating state-defined (as well as state-implemented and 
enforced) grounds for abortion means that health care professionals 
will interpret and apply new terms and definitions with the attendant 
fears of mistake and liability.  Some physicians may resist performing 
now-legal abortions without court or official authorization, possibly 
causing considerable delay and confusion.374  Although some health 
care professionals will always refuse to provide terminations for reli-
gious or moral reasons,375 state reforms may influence previously 
complicit, indifferent, or somewhat supportive physicians to oppose 
abortion.376  This raises the complicated question of backlash, and 
whether law reform, particularly reform implemented through judi-
                                                          
and logistical complications of clinical care, that women learn of these methods through 
friends and family, and that women with basic information about administration of the 
drug are more likely to complete abortions without clinical assistance). 
 372.  Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law Progress Through 
International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 284, 285 n.114, 288 (2011); see also 
Sharad D. Iyengar, Introducing Medical Abortion Within the Primary Health System: Comparison 
with Other Interventions and Commodities, 13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 13, 13 (2005) (dis-
cussing “rigid regulatory systems” as “safeguarding an alien standard of quality that has not 
been adapted to local conditions”). 
 373.  Amado et al., supra note 369, at 120. 
 374.  Id. at 119–20. 
 375.  Id. at 123. 
 376.  For example, in Colombia, women knew where to obtain abortions before decrim-
inalization of the procedure, and their choices were “tolerated” by society.  Id. at 119.  Af-
ter the Supreme Court’s ruling, “in practice the right of Colombian women to access a le-
gal abortion is not yet always recognised by those responsible for providing abortion ser-
services.”  Id. 
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cial decisions, politicizes issues in ways that impede reformists’ 
goals.377 
Without taking a position on the questions of whether and how 
backlash occurs, it is worth noting that, in the countries that have 
been the focus of this Article, anti-abortion advocates impeded 
change after the initial liberalization of abortion.  For example, since 
the Supreme Court of Mexico’s decision in 2007, fifteen district as-
semblies across the country have banned all abortions by enacting 
laws recognizing that human life begins from the moment of concep-
tion.378  Where abortion was once an ignored crime, it now appears 
that hospital staff are taking an active role in reporting patients who 
appear to have self-induced abortion, and law enforcement appears to 
have a newfound interest in prosecuting those women.379 
Finally, because the dominant, rights-oriented approach is a 
model dependent on state implementation, the answer to implemen-
tation problems will be more law.  Following the Colombian, South 
African, and Mexican cases, lawyers returned to court to ask for gov-
ernment-issued guidelines on the delivery of services and the legal du-
ties of health professionals and state officials.380  In Colombia, advo-
cates sued to force the government to provide state funding for low-
income women seeking abortion care and to clarify when physicians 
may refuse to perform a legal abortion.381  In response, the Colombian 
Ministry of Social Protection issued guidelines that attempt to explain 
the definitions of and limitations on refusal rights for providers, to 
provide instructions for what constitutes “good medical attention,” 
and to clarify the requirements that basic insurance plans include 
                                                          
 377.  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in 
Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 251, 251–52 (2009) (discussing 
generally the challenges of social reform litigation and the experiences of Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Thurgood Marshall); cf. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 40, at 2031 (trac-
ing the roots of abortion opposition in the United States in ways that do not support a 
backlash thesis). 
 378.  See Mary Cuddehe, Mexico’s Anti-Abortion Backlash, NATION, Jan. 23, 2012, available 
at http://www.thenation.com/article/165436/mexicos-anti-abortion-backlash (noting 
that, as of 2010, seventeen Mexican states, which is more than half the country, have fetal 
rights amendments). 
 379.  Id. 
 380.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 11, at 1678–81 (discussing the Mexican and Colombian 
litigation that sought legal guidance from state institutions).  It is too early to tell what, if 
any, subsequent litigation will follow the 2010 cases from Portugal and Spain. 
 381.  Id. at 1679–80. 
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abortions coverage.382  Abortion advocates, however, lament the 
vagueness and lack of enforcement of those guidelines.383  Likewise, in 
South Africa, Parliament amended the CTOPA to allow registered 
midwives to perform early-term abortions and to decentralize how 
clinics become approved facilities.384  But the scarcity of resources, in-
cluding a shortage of providers and facilities, persists after the legisla-
tive amendment,385 and legal abortion continues to be elusive 
throughout most of the country.386 
For those who write briefs that serve as vehicles for comparative 
law, a pragmatic basis for comparison might be how the states inter-
vene in, interact with, or tolerate informal avenues for reproductive 
health care might suggest a strong state role in serving as the primary 
conduit of services and information.  In these instances, health care 
professionals and women might feel comfortable with the state as the 
mediator of services, as may be the case in Germany.387 
There are other contexts, however, in which the pursuit of ex-
panded grounds for abortion is a project suited to the traditional 
comparators.  For example, reasons such as mental health or socio-
economic distress can be legal exceptions to criminal laws that permit 
many women to seek abortions for diverse reasons.388  And these 
                                                          
 382.  Amado, supra note 369, at 123–24 (discussing three guidelines instituted by the 
Ministry of Social Protection in Columbia: Decree 4444/2006, defining how and when 
abortions services should be provided; Resolution 4905, providing guidelines for ensuring 
good medical attention for woman requesting a legal termination; and Agreement 
350/2006, stating that abortion should be provided for in basic health care plans). 
 383.  Mónica Roa, Ensuring Reproductive Rights in Colombia: From Constitutional Court Suc-
cess to Reality, ISIS INT’L (Sept. 3, 2008, 8:02 PM), http://www.isiswomen.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=1103&Itemid=200 (describing the challenges of phy-
sician refusals to provide services and the scarcity of funding for services from the point of 
view of the lead lawyer in the 2006 litigation). 
 384.  See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 385.  See, e.g., Diane Cooper et al., Ten Years of Democracy in South Africa: Documenting 
Transformation in Reproductive Health Policy and Status, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 70, 71 
(2004) (discussing the availability of reproductive services in South Africa). 
 386.  For a summary of South African implementation problems, see Rebouché, Repro-
ductive Rights, supra note 149, at 14–25. 
 387.  See Ferree & Gamson, supra note 19, at 60–61 (noting that the German state’s role 
in abortion is publicly promoted as “moral” and “helpful” rather than punitive). 
 388.  This example draws from the Spanish experience, in which, before new legislation 
passed in 2010, over 100,000 women regularly received abortions on the ground of “men-
tal distress.”  Spain OKs New Abortion Law, Angers Church, MSNBC (Feb. 24, 2010, 2:59 PM), 
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grounds can fold into informal practices that straddle legality and il-
legality.389 
Where state power is diffuse and state resources are limited, the 
capacity and limitations of informal regimes might convey interesting 
information about women’s reproductive health needs.390  In coun-
tries like South Africa and Colombia, a well-known informal sector for 
abortion provision could inform statutory or regulatory revision and 
support interventions that tap into existing channels to services.391  
But this requires a more pragmatic comparative method, one that an-
alyzes how law reform should intersect with the availability of abortion 
services.  Close engagement with existing practices and attitudes—
considerations that are arguably absent from current litigation strate-
gies—can help elucidate present alternative opportunities and costs.392 
                                                          
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35565952/ns/world_news-europe/t/spain-oks-new-
abortion-law-angers-church/. The “mental distress” ground had been interpreted to in-
clude socio-economic distress.  See Reed Boland, Selected Legal Developments in Reproductive 
Health, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 178, 179–80 (1991) (noting a case of “physical and mental 
distress” when a Spanish woman could not support another child).  In 2010, however, the 
Spanish Parliament legalized abortion on any ground until the twelfth week of pregnancy.  
The Constitutional Court of Spain dismissed an early constitutional challenge to the law’s 
enforceability, declining to decide the issue of constitutionality before it came into force.  
S.T.C., July 14, 2010 (B.O.E., No. 90/2010, p. 118, 122).  Exhibiting a pattern described 
above, however, the dissenting opinion contrasted the majority’s position with the German 
Constitutional Court’s 1975 decision, arguing that a fetus’s right to life should trump a 
woman’s right to abortion.  Id. at 126 (Delgado Barrio, J., dissenting). 
 389.  For example, in “menstrual regulation,” a health professional administers the 
drug combination that results in a medical abortion if no more than eight weeks have 
passed since a patient’s last menstrual cycle.  Because the patient never takes a pregnancy 
test, however, the procedure is not considered a termination.  Choudhury, supra note 372, 
at 294 (explaining the practice of menstrual regulation in Bangladesh). 
 390.  See Iyengar, supra note 372, at 14 (“[W]here the enforcement of laws and regula-
tions is weak, as in the rural interiors and urban slums, a primary health underworld 
thrives on the need for essential services for the poor.”). 
 391.  Public health scholars have called for demedicalization of primary health care ser-
vices: introducing self-medication, removing facility requirements, and expanding the cat-
egories of persons that can administer health services.  Id. at 15. 
 392.  See Jeremy Elkins, Beyond “Beyond the State”: Rethinking Law and Globalization, in LAW 
WITHOUT NATIONS 22, 37–39 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011) (couching a normative theory 
of cognition in a legal realist heritage); see also Libby Adler, Gay Rights and Gay Lefts, HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. COLLOQUIUM (Sept. 2, 2011), http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/Libby_Adler_Gay_Rights_And_Lefts.pdf (modeling risks-
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A new source of comparison is needed to capture pragmatic in-
fluences that account for the state’s ability to implement formal 
rights.393  Some reform strategies will be better suited to the tradition-
al, rights-based model, but others will not.  By focusing on state capac-
ity to implement laws and perhaps suggesting that informal mecha-
nisms might better suit some contexts, the power imbalances between 
political economies becomes a focus of comparison, rather than treat-
ing all law reform as if it has a North American or Western European 
trajectory. 
                                                          
benefits analyses for social justice and rights reform projects); HALLEY, supra note 330, at 
304 (modeling a process of assessing the costs and benefits of her proposal to “take a 
break from feminism”). 
 393.  I elaborate on an alternative comparative methodology in greater detail in a chap-
ter, Functionalist Approaches to Comparative Abortion Law, in the forthcoming book, SHIFTING 
PARADIGMS IN ABORTION LAW, edited by Rebecca Cook, Bernard Dickens, and Joanna 
Erdman. 
